Mark Harrison v. J. Dennerline , 670 F. App'x 587 ( 2016 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           NOV 7 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARK HARRISON,                                   No. 15-17556
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01060-SPL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    J. DENNERLINE, Arizona Fish and Game
    Department employee #365; ARIZONA
    DEPARTMENT OF GAME AND FISH,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 25, 2016**
    Before:      LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Mark Harrison appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging constitutional claims relating to his
    misdemeanor prosecution. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Starr v. Baca, 
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Harrison’s Fourteenth Amendment
    claims because Harrison was neither denied procedural due process nor subjected
    to conduct that violated his substantive due process rights. See County of
    Sacramento v. Lewis, 
    523 U.S. 833
    , 834 (1998) (“[T]he cognizable level of
    executive abuse of power [for a substantive due process violation] is that which
    shocks the conscience[.]”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 333 (1976) (“The
    fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard
    ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Harrison’s
    complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Serra
    v. Lappin, 
    600 F.3d 1191
    , 1195 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review
    and factors for a district court to consider in determining whether to grant leave to
    amend); see also Karam v. City of Burbank, 
    352 F.3d 1188
    , 1191-92 (9th Cir.
    2003) (no Fourth Amendment seizure where plaintiff was not charged with a
    felony, was not arrested, and was only required to appear in court).
    Harrison’s contentions that the district court’s actions prejudiced him are
    unpersuasive.
    We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
    2                                      15-17556
    not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
    v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   15-17556