Bisno Development Enterprises v. Barry Levine , 671 F. App'x 427 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    NOV 23 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BISNO DEVELOPMENT                               No. 14-57008
    ENTERPRISE, LLC,
    D.C. No. 2:13-cv-07961-R-PJW
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    BARRY LEVINE, et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel J. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 9, 2016
    Pasadena, California
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    Bisno Development Enterprise, LLC (“BDE”) appeals from summary
    judgment granted to defendants Barry Levine, Ari Schottenstein, Protilus
    Investors, LLC, Illus Investors, LP, Ilus GP US, LLC, Ridgemount Investments,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Inc., Alex Iscoe, and David Ulmer (collectively “Levine defendants”), which
    rejected its California state law claims of intentional interference with contract and
    quantum meruit. As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as
    necessary to explain our decision.
    I
    BDE contends that it had an agreement with Vineyard Development Inc.
    (“VDI”) under which it was entitled to receive a share in the profits from the
    development of certain property in Santa, Ana, California. BDE further argues that,
    by causing the dissolution of a venture between VDI and the Levine defendants to
    develop this property, the Levine defendants interfered with its agreement with
    VDI.
    But, in order to bring an intentional interference with contract claim, BDE
    must first demonstrate that it had enforceable contract with VDI. See Pac. Gas &
    Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 
    791 P.2d 587
    , 589–90 (Cal. 1990). BDE
    acknowledges that the record does not contain such a written agreement;
    nonetheless it contends that various documents in the record demonstrate the
    existence of an oral agreement. BDE points to the declaration of Ryan Ogulnick,
    the owner of VDI, who stated that he made an oral agreement under which “BDE
    might be eligible for a discretionary success bonus—at [his] sole and absolute
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    discretion.” Such a discretionary agreement is unenforceable, however, because
    there is no way to determine if there has been a breach. See Moncada v. W. Coast
    Quartz Corp., 
    164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601
    , 609–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Ladas v. Cal.
    State Auto. Ass’n, 
    23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810
    , 814–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Other
    documents in the record also fail to provide the terms of an enforceable agreement.
    Thus, BDE cannot recover for intentional interference with contract.
    II
    Alternatively, BDE argues that it should be entitled to recovery in quantum
    meruit. Yet, BDE has failed to provide evidence of actual damages. The parties do
    not dispute that BDE received $8,000/month under a separate contract with VDC
    at The Met, LLC (“VDCATM”), the corporate entity created by VDI and the
    Levine defendants to develop the property. BDE contends that its services
    increased the value of the property, entitling it to further compensation. However,
    under California law, plaintiffs cannot base recovery on the amount of the benefit
    conferred on defendants. Maglica v. Maglica, 
    78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101
    , 105–06 (Cal.
    Ct. App. 1998).
    Further, BDE failed to confer a direct benefit upon the defendants, another
    requirement of California law. See 
    id. at 104
    . It was hired to provide services to
    VDCATM, which is not a party to this litigation. BDE requests that we remand the
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    case to allow it to amend its complaint to allege that the defendants were alter egos
    of VDCATM. However, it has waived its ability to make this request by not
    presenting it to the district court or raising it in its opening brief before our court.
    See United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 
    655 F.3d 984
    , 995 (9th Cir. 2011); Smith
    v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, BDE’s request for relief in
    quantum meruit also fails.
    AFFIRMED.
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