Prasad Shankar v. Hsbc, Inc. , 408 F. App'x 63 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 07 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PRASAD SHANKAR, No. 09-17381
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:08-cv-01769-JW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
HSBC, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2010 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Prasad Shankar appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of HSBC, Inc. in his employment action alleging retaliation in violation of Title
VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Learned v.
City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1988), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment. Shankar’s claims
based on his first and second Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
charges are time barred because he filed his lawsuit more than 90 days after the
EEOC issued right-to-sue letters. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Scholar v. Pac.
Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The requirement for filing a Title VII
civil action within 90 days from the date EEOC dismisses a claim constitutes a statute
of limitations.”). Regarding the claims in his third EEOC charge, Shankar failed to
raise triable issues as to whether he engaged in protected activity and whether his
termination was causally connected to the alleged protected activity. See Villiarimo
v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (18-month lapse
between protected activity and an adverse employment action is too long to give rise
to an inference of causation); Learned, 860 F.2d at 932 (complaining about conduct
not prohibited by Title VII does not constitute protected activity); Cohen v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Essential to a causal link is evidence
that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity.”).
Shankar’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We deny Shankar’s motion to supplement the record. See Kirshner v. Uniden
Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).
AFFIRMED.
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