In re A.W. , 2012 Ohio 1629 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as In re A.W., 2012-Ohio-1629.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    IN RE A.W.
    CALVIN CLIFTON WHEELER
    Petitioner
    v.
    JENNIFER GADEGBEKU
    Respondent
    Appellate Case No. 25017
    DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
    April 3rd , 2012
    PER CURIAM:
    {¶ 1} This matter is before the court on Calvin Wheeler’s January 31, 2012 petition
    for a writ of prohibition. Wheeler seeks an order from this Court that prohibits Judge Anthony
    Capizzi of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, from issuing an order
    that commands Wheeler to return the minor child, A.W., to her mother, Jennifer Gadegbeku.
    {¶ 2} A.W. is the minor child of Wheeler and Gadegbeku, who were never married.
    It is alleged that A.W. has been living with Wheeler, his wife, and their daughter in Michigan since
    April 2010.
    {¶ 3} On March 1, 2011, Wheeler filed a petition for custody of A.W. in the Circuit
    Court for Ingham County, Michigan, Family Division. Pursuant to an ex-parte order dated March
    2
    7, 2011, the Michigan court granted Wheeler temporary sole physical custody of A.W. while
    Gadegbeku was granted supervised parenting time. The issues of custody, parenting time, and
    child support were referred to a conciliator for further proceedings.
    {¶ 4} Shortly after the March 7, 2011 ex-parte order was issued by the Michigan
    court, Gadegbeku filed a complaint for custody and motion for an ex-parte order/hearing in the
    Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, Ohio, Juvenile Division. On March 17, 2011, the
    Ohio juvenile court ordered Wheeler to return A.W. to Gadegbeku immediately, finding that:
    The mother is the sole legal custodian pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
    §3109.04 and therefore remains the sole legal custodian.1 The father shall return the
    child to the mother forthwith and any law enforcement officer is authorized to assist
    the mother in the return of the child to her. The mother and child are both residents
    of Ohio. The child was removed from the mother by the father without the mother’s
    permission. Father is to apply to Ohio Court for any further relief sought.
    {¶ 5} A.W. remained in Wheeler’s custody. On June 12, 2011, the Michigan
    family court adopted a referee’s recommendation that Wheeler be granted sole legal and physical
    custody of A.W. with Gadegbeku entitled to exercise parenting time. The court noted that a
    question of jurisdiction had been raised due to Gadegbeku receiving an ex-parte order from the
    Montgomery County, Ohio juvenile court that granted her physical custody of A.W. However, the
    referee found that Michigan had “home state” jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
    1
    In its motion to dismiss, Respondent cites R.C. 3109.042 as its basis for
    jurisdiction to hear custody matters involving unmarried parents. That section states
    that “[a]n unmarried female who gives birth to a child is the sole residential parent and
    legal custodian of the child until a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order
    designating another person as the residential parent and legal custodian.”
    3
    Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), as codified in Michigan law. Both Wheeler and
    Gadegbeku participated in the child-custody proceedings.
    {¶ 6} In an effort to resolve the conflicting custody orders issued by the Michigan
    and Ohio courts, Wheeler filed a petition for custody in the Montgomery County, Ohio juvenile
    court on November 18, 2011. The matter proceeded to a hearing before a magistrate on January 23,
    2012, the decision from which was adopted by the juvenile court on January 27, 2012. The court
    found that A.W. had been ordered to be returned to Gadegbeku on March 17, 2012, but Wheeler did
    not return the child.    The court further found that by filing his petition for custody in the
    Montgomery County court, Wheeler submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and, thus,
    remained under a legal duty to return A.W. forthwith. The court scheduled the issue of custody of
    A.W. for trial to be held April 20, 2012.
    Writ of Prohibition
    {¶ 7} The writ of prohibition has been described as an “extraordinary remedy which
    is customarily granted with caution and restraint, * * * issued only in cases of necessity arising from
    the inadequacies of other remedies.” State ex rel. Henry v. Britt, 
    67 Ohio St. 2d 71
    , 73, 
    424 N.E.2d 297
    (1981). The purpose of the writ is to restrain lower courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.
    {¶ 8} In order to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Wheeler must establish “(1)
    that the court or officer against whom the writ is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
    power, (2) that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying a writ will
    result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.” Goldstein
    v. Christiansen, 
    70 Ohio St. 3d 232
    , 234-35, 
    638 N.E.2d 541
    (1994), citing State ex rel. Koren v.
    Grogan, 
    68 Ohio St. 3d 590
    , 
    629 N.E.2d 446
    (1994). In cases “where jurisdiction is patently and
    4
    unambiguously lacking, the requirement of the lack of an adequate remedy at law need not be
    proven, because the availability of alternate remedies like appeal is immaterial.”         Rosen v.
    Celebrezze, 
    117 Ohio St. 3d 241
    , 2008-Ohio-853, 
    883 N.E.2d 420
    , ¶ 18.
    {¶ 9} Wheeler argues that Judge Capizzi patently and unambiguously lacked
    jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to order the return of A.W. since the Circuit Court for Ingham
    County, Michigan previously granted Wheeler sole physical custody of the child. Respondent, in
    opposition, contends that Wheeler’s petition claims errors in the exercise of the juvenile court’s
    jurisdiction rather than a complete lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    {¶ 10} There is no dispute that the Montgomery County, Ohio juvenile court has
    jurisdiction to determine custody matters. R.C. 2151.23(A). That authority is subject to the
    UCCJEA, however, when the matter involves modifying a child-custody determination made by an
    out-of-state court. In such a situation, R.C. 3127.17 provides:
    Except as otherwise provided in section 3127.18 of the Revised Code, a court
    of this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another
    state unless the court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination
    under division (A)(1) or (2) of section 3127.15 of the Revised Code and one of the
    following applies:
    (A) The court of the other state determines that it no longer has exclusive,
    continuing jurisdiction under section 3127.16 of the Revised Code or a similar
    statute of the other state or that a court of this state would be a more convenient
    forum under section 3127.21 of the Revised Code or a similar statute of the other
    state.
    5
    (B) The court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the
    child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in
    the other state.
    {¶ 11} With respect to the first requirement, R.C. 3127.15(A) specifies the following
    jurisdictional grounds for an Ohio court to make an initial determination in a child-custody
    proceeding:
    (A) Except as otherwise provided in section 3127.18 of the Revised Code, a
    court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination in a child custody
    proceeding only if one of the following applies:
    (1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement
    of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the
    commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent
    or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.2
    (2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under division (A)(1)
    of this section or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise
    jurisdiction on the basis that this state is the more appropriate forum under section
    3127.21 or 3127.22 of the Revised Code, or a similar statute of the other state, and
    both of the following are the case:
    (a) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a
    person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than
    2
    “‘Home state’” means the state in which the child lived with a parent or a
    person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the
    commencement of a child custody proceeding * * * .” R.C. 3127.01(B)(7).
    6
    mere physical presence.
    (b) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection,
    training, and personal relationships.
    (3) All courts having jurisdiction under division (A)(1) or (2) of this section
    have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the
    more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under section 3127.21
    or 3127.22 of the Revised Code or a similar statute enacted by another state.
    {¶ 12} Respondent contends that it expressly found in its March 17, 2011 order that
    A.W.’s “home state” is Ohio because both A.W. and Gadegbeku are residents of Ohio, and A.W.
    was removed from Ohio by Wheeler without Gadegbeku’s permission. R.C. 3127.22 governs the
    effect of unjustifiable conduct upon the jurisdiction of an Ohio court. “Subsection (A) of the
    statute generally states that any court of our state should decline to exercise its authority over a
    custody matter when the acts forming the foundation of its jurisdiction constituted unjustifiable
    conduct.” McGhan v. Vettel, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2008-A-0036, 2008-Ohio-6063, ¶ 37. This
    is not a situation where either party has invoked the Ohio court’s jurisdiction by engaging in
    unjustifiable conduct. Instead, by finding that it has home-state jurisdiction, the juvenile court’s
    order presumes that Wheeler improperly, and with unjustifiable conduct, invoked the jurisdiction of
    the Michigan family court, thereby nullifying the effect of its custody determination.
    {¶ 13} Respondent’s jurisdictional argument is flawed. Although the court does not
    expressly utilize R.C. 3127.22(A), the procedure therein “cannot be employed in a second court to
    contest the validity of the original order. In other words, it must be assumed that, if applicable, the
    issue of unjustifiable conduct was raised and fully litigated in the first court before the original
    7
    decision was made.” 
    Id. at ¶
    39. The Montgomery County juvenile court may not simply ignore
    the custody determination of the Michigan family court on the basis that Wheeler invoked the
    Michigan court’s jurisdiction by way of unjustifiable conduct. That court was competent to fully
    litigate this and other issues raised by the parties. After hearing testimony from both parties and
    multiple witnesses regarding the length of time and circumstances under which A.W. had been
    living in Michigan prior to Wheeler filing his complaint for custody in the Ingham County family
    court, the court made the following determination that it had home-state jurisdiction to hear the
    case:
    3. Jurisdiction: Referee finds that the parties’ child [A.W.] resided in the
    state of Michigan since on or about April 29, 2010, which is more than six
    consecutive months prior to Plaintiff filing a Verified Complaint for Custody on
    March 1, 2011.     Referee finds that pursuant to MCL722.1102(g), the state of
    Michigan has “home state” jurisdiction under the UCCJEA as follows: “Home state”
    means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for
    at least six months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody
    proceeding.     June 12, 2011 Referee Recommendation and Order Regarding
    Plaintiff’s   Complaint   for   Custody    and   Objections    to   the   Conciliator’s
    Recommendation.
    {¶ 14} We find that the facts alleged in Wheeler’s petition establish that Michigan
    was the home state of A.W. prior to Wheeler filing his complaint for custody on March 1, 2012.
    R.C. 3127.15(A)(1); MCL722.1102(g). As a result, the Montgomery County juvenile court lacked
    the authority to modify the Michigan court’s March 7, 2011 custody order because the Ohio court
    8
    did not have jurisdiction at that point to make an initial determination in the custody matter. R.C.
    3127.17.
    {¶ 15} Nor does the fact that Respondent found Gadegbeku to be the sole custodian
    of the child under R.C. 3109.042 result in a different conclusion. That statute states that “[a]n
    unmarried female who gives birth to a child is the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the
    child until a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order designating another person as the
    residential parent and legal custodian.”     We find that the Michigan family court’s custody
    determination is an order by a court of competent jurisdiction designating a person other than
    Gadegbeku the custodian of A.W.
    {¶ 16} Finally, contrary to Respondent’s argument, this is not a case where the
    petition has raised claims amounting to mere error in the trial court’s jurisdiction. State ex rel.
    Florence v. Zitter, 
    106 Ohio St. 3d 87
    , 2005-Ohio-3804, ¶ 26. The Montgomery County, Ohio
    juvenile court’s lack of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA “is a defect in the Ohio court’s
    subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rosen, 
    117 Ohio St. 3d 241
    , 2008-Ohio-853, 
    883 N.E.2d 420
    , at ¶ 44.
    R.C. 3127.15(A) sets forth the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody
    determination by a court of Ohio. See R.C. 3127.15(B).
    {¶ 17} In conclusion, we find that the Montgomery County juvenile court lacked
    jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination in its March 17, 2011 order. Accordingly, we
    hereby GRANT Wheeler’s petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Capizzi from
    proceeding with the issue of child custody in the underlying case. Respondent’s motion to dismiss
    is OVERRULED. Custody of A.W. shall remain with Wheeler pursuant to the determination made
    by the Circuit Court for Ingham County, Michigan.
    9
    SO ORDERED.
    THOMAS J. GRADY, Presiding Judge
    MIKE FAIN, Judge
    JEFFREY E. FROELICH, Judge
    To The Clerk: Within three (3) days of entering this judgment on the journal, you are
    directed to serve on all parties not in default for failure to appear notice of the judgment and the date
    of its entry upon the journal, pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B).
    THOMAS J. GRADY, Presiding Judge
    Copies provided to:
    Eugene Robinson
    Attorney for Petitioner
    131 N. Ludlow Street, Suite 304
    Dayton, Ohio 45402
    John Cumming
    Attorney for Hon. Anthony Capizzi
    301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor
    Dayton, Ohio 45422
    Jennifer Gadegbeku
    Respondent, Pro Se
    10
    4403 Burkhardt Avenue, #C2
    Dayton, Ohio 45431
    Hon. Anthony Capizzi
    Montgomery County Juvenile Court
    380 W. Second Street
    Dayton, Ohio 45422
    CA3/JN
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 25017

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 1629

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 4/3/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021