City of Lawrenceburg, Indiana and City of Lawrenceburg Board of Works v. Grant Hughes (mem. dec.) , 110 N.E.3d 365 ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing FILED
the defense of res judicata, collateral Aug 27 2018, 8:49 am
estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Mary Jane Lapointe
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Daniel Lapointe Kent
Lapointe Law Firm, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
City of Lawrenceburg, Indiana August 27, 2018
and City of Lawrenceburg Board Court of Appeals Case No.
of Works, 18A-PL-439
Appellants-Defendants, Appeal from the Dearborn
Superior Court
v. The Honorable Jonathan N.
Cleary, Judge
Grant Hughes, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Plaintiff. 15D01-1607-PL-48
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Former Lawrenceburg Redevelopment Director/Mayor’s Assistant Grant
Hughes sued the City of Lawrenceburg and the Lawrenceburg Board of Public
Works (collectively, “the City”) seeking compensation to which he claimed to
be entitled following his termination. The trial court considered competing
summary judgment motions before ruling in Hughes’s favor. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Hughes entered into an employment contract (the “Agreement”) with the City
on March 17, 2014. The Agreement was signed by then-Mayor Dennis Carr
and each member of the Board of Works. It was also signed by Hughes.
[3] According to the terms of the Agreement, Hughes’s employment commenced
on March 17, 2014, “and shall continue until the 17th day of March, 2015.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 17. The Agreement provided that “[u]nless
terminated [pursuant to the terms of the Agreement], and unless either party
gives at least sixty (60) days notice of an intention to terminate the Agreement
at the end of a given term, this Agreement and term of [Hughes’s] employment
shall be automatically extended for consecutive one (1) year terms.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 17. The parties agreed that Hughes would be
compensated at a rate of $85,202.00 per year. The Agreement further provided
as follows:
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In the event the City discontinues operating the offices of the
Redevelopment Director and/or the Mayor’s Assistant, then this
Agreement shall terminate as of the date of the discontinuance of
operation of said office, and on the same date, the City shall be
obligated to pay [Hughes] the balance of his compensation under
this Agreement, including the costs of all benefits.
****
If [Hughes] is terminated without cause, [Hughes] shall be
entitled to receive the balance of his compensation under this
Agreement, including the cost of all benefits. The City may
terminate the Agreement without cause upon thirty (30) days
written notice and approval of the majority vote of the Board of
Works.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19.
[4] Hughes was employed by the City until November 12, 2015, when he was
notified by Mayor Carr that the City had decided to eliminate Hughes’s
position. Mayor Carr further notified Hughes that, pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement, “all existing employee benefits will remain in effect until March 17,
2016.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 102. Mayor Carr’s successor, Mayor Kelly
Mollaun, subsequently notified Hughes that as of January 4, 2016, the City had
terminated his benefits and salary rather than continuing payment until the
March 17, 2016 date required by the terms of the Agreement.
[5] Following the termination of his employment, on July 13, 2016, Hughes filed
suit against the City seeking compensation for the period between January 4,
2016 and the March 17, 2016 Agreement expiration date. The parties filed
competing summary judgment motions. Following a hearing on the parties’
motions, the trial court granted Hughes’s summary judgment motion, denied
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the City’s summary judgment motion, and entered judgment against the City in
the amount of $42,378.54.
Discussion and Decision
[6] The City contends that the trial court erred in granting Hughes’s summary
judgment motion. In challenging the trial court’s award of summary judgment
to Hughes, the City does not point to any designated evidence that it claims
creates an evidentiary issue of material fact. Rather, it makes three legal
arguments as to why it believes it was improper to grant summary judgment in
favor of Hughes.
Our standard of review of a summary judgment order is well-
settled: summary judgment is appropriate if the “designated
evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).… A genuine issue of
material fact exists where facts concerning an issue which would
dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed
material facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on
such an issue. [Commercial Coin Laundry Sys. v. Enneking, 766
N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)]. Even if the facts are
undisputed, summary judgment is inappropriate where the record
reveals an incorrect application of the law to the facts. Id.
On appeal, we are bound to the same standard as the trial court,
and we consider only those matters which were designated at the
summary judgment stage. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence,
but we liberally construe all designated evidentiary material in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. A
grant of summary judgment may be affirmed upon any theory
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supported by the designated materials. Id. at 439. The fact that
the parties make cross-motions for summary judgment does not
alter our standard of review. Id.
Huntington v. Riggs, 862 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
[7] The City argues that the Agreement is void and unenforceable because it
violates the provisions of Indiana Code section 36-4-8-12(b), which indicates
that a representative of a city “may not obligate the city to any extent beyond
the amount of money appropriate for that department.… An obligation made
in violation of this section is void.” The crux of the City’s argument is that the
Agreement is void and unenforceable under Indiana Code section 36-4-8-12(b)
because it subjected the City to an ongoing obligation that was unfunded after
the first year. However, when read as a whole, it is clear that Indiana Code
section 36-4-8-12 does not apply to employees but rather to other types of
contracts entered into on behalf of a city. Thus, the City’s reliance on this
provision is misplaced.
[8] The City also argues that the Agreement violates the provisions of Indiana
Code section 36-4-7-3. The relevant portion of Indiana Code section 36-4-7-3,
which involves employee compensation, provides as follows:
(b) Subject to the approval of the city legislative body, the city
executive shall fix the compensation of each appointive officer,
deputy, and other employee of the city. The legislative body may
reduce but may not increase any compensation fixed by the
executive. Compensation must be fixed under this section not
later than November 1 of each year for the ensuing budget year.
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In this case, the Board of Works fixed and budgeted for Hughes’s salary at all
times relevant to the Agreement. The designated evidence shows that funds
were apportioned for Hughes’s position during both the 2014-2015 and 2015-
2016 contract years. It also establishes that the decision of whether to renew
the Agreement for an additional year was to be made before the November 1
deadline set forth in Indiana Code section 36-4-7-3.
[9] Finally, the City argues that the contract is void because it violated the
provisions of Indiana Code section 36-4-9-2 by binding the new mayor to
employment decisions made by the prior mayor. Hughes does not dispute the
City’s assertion that Mayor Mollaun could not be bound by Mayor Carr’s
employment decisions. He argues, however, that the Agreement did not violate
this provision as subsequent mayors were not bound by Mayor Carr’s decision
to employ him as it expressly provided the procedure for calculating amounts
due upon expiration of the Agreement, the elimination of his position, or his
termination.
[10] The Agreement provided that the City could, at any time, decide to eliminate
Hughes’s position or terminate Hughes’s employment without cause. In fact,
Hughes’s position was eliminated on November 12, 2015. The Agreement
stated that if the City decided to eliminate Hughes’s position or terminate his
employment, it was obligated to pay Hughes “the balance of his compensation
under this Agreement, including the cost of all benefits.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
II, p. 19. The designated evidence establishes that the City chose to exercise its
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right to eliminate Hughes’s position but failed to compensate Hughes according
to these terms.
Conclusion
[11] We conclude that record does not reveal any incorrect application of the law to
the facts. In addition, the City does not point to any designated evidence that
would render the trial court’s award of summary judgment in Hughes’s favor
improper. The designated evidence supports the trial court’s award of summary
judgment for Hughes as it proves that the parties entered into a valid
employment contract and that the City breached this contract by failing to
compensate Hughes through March 17, 2016.
[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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