Rafael Robledo Arroyo v. Loretta E. Lynch , 671 F. App'x 516 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 08 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAFAEL ROBLEDO ARROYO, AKA No. 14-72732
Rafael Arroyo, AKA Rafael Robledo,
AKA Maximilian Robledo Alvarado, Agency No. A205-314-666
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 5, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judges, and OWENS,
Circuit Judge.
Rafael Robledo Arroyo (“Arroyo”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
motion to reopen removal proceedings to apply for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion, Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), and
we DENY the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen
because Arroyo failed to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought. See
Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In order to prevail on his
motion to reopen the proceedings on the basis of changed country conditions,
Toufighi needed to clear four hurdles: (1) he had to produce evidence that
conditions had changed in Iran; (2) the evidence had to be ‘material;’ (3) the
evidence must not have been available and would not have been discovered or
presented at the previous proceeding; and (4) he had to ‘demonstrate that the new
evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original
hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.’ The Board
could thus deny the motion to reopen for failing to meet any of these burdens.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (“The BIA can
deny a motion to reopen on any one of at least three independent grounds,”
including “failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought”) (citation
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and internal quotation marks omitted). In light of this conclusion, we do not reach
Arroyo’s remaining contentions.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3