American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Krop , 427 Ill. Dec. 915 ( 2018 )


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  •                                      
    2018 IL 122556
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    (Docket No. 122556)
    AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v.
    WALTER KROP et al., Appellees (Andy Varga, Appellant).
    Opinion filed October 18, 2018.
    JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Burke, and Neville concurred in
    the judgment and opinion.
    Justice Theis dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Kilbride.
    OPINION
    ¶1       When customers allege that their insurance company negligently sold them a
    deficient insurance policy, section 13-214.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)
    gives those customers a two-year deadline to file any lawsuits. 735 ILCS
    5/13-214.4 (West 2014). In this case we are asked to determine when the cause of
    action accrues in such cases. American Family Mutual Insurance Company
    (American Family) filed a declaratory judgment action against Walter and Lisa
    Krop, contending their homeowner’s insurance policy did not cover a tort action
    pending against their son. The Krops filed a counterclaim against American Family
    and a third-party claim against Andrew Varga, an insurance agent for American
    Family. Varga argued at the circuit court that the cause of action for negligently
    selling a deficient policy accrues as soon as customers purchase their policy. The
    Krops claimed that the cause of action does not accrue until the insurer refuses to
    provide coverage. Agreeing with Varga, the circuit court dismissed the Krops’
    claims against Varga and American Family as untimely. The appellate court
    reversed. 
    2017 IL App (1st) 161071
    . Varga petitioned for leave to appeal, and we
    allowed the petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).
    ¶2       We hold that when customers have the opportunity to read their insurance
    policy and can reasonably be expected to understand its terms, the cause of action
    for negligent failure to procure insurance accrues as soon as the customers receive
    the policy. Here the Krops filed their complaint over two years after they received
    their American Family policy, and they did not plead facts that would support any
    recognized exception to the expectation that customers will read the policy and
    understand its terms, so their claim was untimely. We reverse the appellate court’s
    decision.
    ¶3                                    BACKGROUND
    ¶4       In early 2012 Walter and Lisa Krop asked Andrew Varga to provide them with
    a new homeowner’s insurance policy from American Family. Although the details
    of their interactions with Varga are contested, the Krops claim that they gave him a
    copy of their old policy with Travelers insurance company and requested a new
    policy that was “equal to the coverages provided by Travelers.” They further allege
    that Varga promised to provide them with an American Family policy that was
    equal to or better than the Travelers policy for a similar price. American Family and
    the Krops agreed to a policy, which American Family issued on March 21, 2012.
    The Krops renewed this policy each of the next three years.
    -2­
    ¶5       In mid-2014, Mary Andreolas sued the Krops, seeking damages for defamation,
    invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The specifics
    of the lawsuit are not relevant to this decision, except that on August 20, 2014,
    American Family denied the Krops coverage for Andreolas’s suit.
    ¶6       Soon thereafter American Family filed a declaratory judgment action in the
    circuit court of Cook County to justify its denial of coverage. The complaint cited
    portions of the Krops’ policy that American Family argued excluded the alleged
    torts from coverage. In a section of the policy titled “LIABILITY
    COVERAGES—SECTION II,” American Family had promised:
    “We will pay, up to our limit, compensatory damages for which any insured is
    legally liable because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an
    occurrence covered by this policy.”
    The policy’s definition of “bodily injury” excluded “emotional or mental distress,
    mental anguish, mental injury, or any similar injury unless it arises out of actual
    bodily harm to the person.” Finally, the policy defined “occurrence” as “an
    accident, including exposure to conditions, which results during the policy period
    in: a. bodily injury; or b. property damage.”
    ¶7       American Family claimed that this policy did not cover liability for the alleged
    defamation, invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress
    because Andreolas did not seek damages for any bodily injury. Additionally,
    American Family argued that, because the policy only covered “damage caused by
    an occurrence” and an “occurrence” requires an “accident,” the policy did not cover
    the Krops’ liability for the intentional conduct that Andreolas alleged.
    ¶8       On September 3, 2015, the Krops responded with a counterclaim against
    American Family and a third-party complaint against Varga. They alleged that
    Varga negligently failed to provide them with an insurance policy equal to their
    Travelers policy, as they had requested, and that American Family was vicariously
    liable for its agent’s negligence. The Travelers policy had covered liability for
    “personal injury” as well as bodily and property injuries. Although both policies
    extended coverage to injuries caused by “occurrences,” the Travelers policy
    defined “occurrence” to include an “offense *** that results in ‘personal injury.’ ”
    The American Family policy did not include offenses causing personal injury in its
    -3­
    definition of “occurrence.” According to the Krops, Varga failed to exercise
    ordinary care, and this failure caused the Krops to lack coverage for personal
    liability in Andreolas’s lawsuit.
    ¶9         Varga and American Family both moved to dismiss the Krops’ claims under
    sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2014).
    Section 13-214.4 of the Code creates a two-year statute of limitations for claims
    against insurance producers. 
    Id. § 13-214.4.
    Varga and American Family argued
    that this two-year period began when the Krops first received their policy in March
    2012, so their claims were untimely after March 2014.
    ¶ 10       The circuit court dismissed the Krops’ counterclaims under section 2-619 of the
    Code. Relying on Hoover v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 
    2012 IL App (1st) 110939
    , the court found that the two-year limitations period for claims against
    insurance producers begins as soon as the insurer issues the policy. It rejected the
    Krops’ argument that they could not have known about the defect in their policy,
    reasoning instead that insurance customers have an obligation to read their policies
    and understand the terms. Because American Family issued the Krops’ policy on
    March 21, 2012, the court concluded that all claims after March 21, 2014, were
    untimely. The Krops filed their counterclaims and third-party complaint on
    September 22, 2015, so the circuit court granted Varga’s and American Family’s
    motions to dismiss.
    ¶ 11       The appellate court reversed the dismissal. 
    2017 IL App (1st) 161071
    . It stated
    that other Illinois cases have distinguished between lawsuits alleging negligence by
    an insurer, like American Family, and those alleging negligence by an agent, like
    Varga. 
    Id. ¶ 34
    (citing Perelman v. Fisher, 
    298 Ill. App. 3d 1007
    (1998)). Based on
    those decisions, the appellate court found that insurance agents owe their customers
    a fiduciary duty and that this duty is more significant than the customers’ obligation
    to read their policy. The court concluded that the limitations period did not begin to
    run when the policy was issued in March 2012. Instead, the “discovery rule”
    delayed the start of the limitations period until the Krops knew or should have
    known of the injury. Finally, the court found that the Krops reasonably should have
    known of the injury only when American Family denied them coverage in August
    2014 and that the Krops’ claims in September 2015 were timely. 
    Id. ¶ 36.
    Varga
    petitioned this court for leave to appeal, but American Family did not. We allowed
    -4­
    Varga’s petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).
    ¶ 12                                        ANALYSIS
    ¶ 13       The circuit court granted Varga’s section 2-619 motion, and we review a
    dismissal under section 2-619 de novo. Kean v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    235 Ill. 2d 351
    , 361 (2009). A section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the
    complaint but asserts another affirmative matter that defeats the claim. King v. First
    Capital Financial Services Corp., 
    215 Ill. 2d 1
    , 12 (2005). Section 2-619(a)(5)
    authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint that was filed outside of the relevant
    limitations period. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2014). When reviewing a
    dismissal under section 2-619, this court will affirm only if there is no genuine issue
    of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kedzie &
    103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 
    156 Ill. 2d 112
    , 116-17 (1993). It also
    admits as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
    from them. Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 
    227 Ill. 2d 343
    , 352 (2008). We
    construe those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
    Id. ¶ 14
             A. Earliest Accrual Date for Negligent Failure to Procure Insurance
    ¶ 15       The Krops’ suit is premised on Varga’s alleged failure to satisfy his statutory
    obligation in procuring an American Family insurance contract for the Krops.
    Section 2-2201(a) of the Code states that “[a]n insurance producer, registered firm,
    and limited insurance representative shall exercise ordinary care and skill in
    renewing, procuring, binding, or placing the coverage requested by the insured or
    proposed insured.” 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(a) (West 2014). The section does not define
    “insurance producer,” but we have held that this term includes “captive agents” like
    Varga, who represent a particular insurance company and sell that company’s
    policies to customers. Skaperdas v. Country Casualty Insurance Co., 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶¶ 19, 23. The Krops alleged that Varga breached the insurance producer’s
    duty of ordinary care.
    ¶ 16      Section 13-214.4 of the Code is the statute of limitations for such claims. It
    provides that:
    -5­
    “All causes of action brought by any person or entity under any statute or any
    legal or equitable theory against an insurance producer, registered firm, or
    limited insurance representative concerning the sale, placement, procurement,
    renewal, cancellation of, or failure to procure any policy of insurance shall be
    brought within 2 years of the date the cause of action accrues.” 735 ILCS
    5/13-214.4 (West 2014).
    ¶ 17       Although this statute clearly bars a claim under section 2-2201(a) filed more
    than two years after the cause of action accrues, it does not define what constitutes
    accrual. To fill this gap, this court has explained that, for tort claims,
    “the cause of action usually accrues when the plaintiff suffers injury.
    [Citations.] For contract actions and torts arising out of contractual
    relationships, though, the cause of action ordinarily accrues at the time of the
    breach of contract, not when a party sustains damages. [Citations.] The reason
    for this distinction is the concern that plaintiffs will delay bringing suit after a
    contract is breached in order to increase damages.” Hermitage Corp. v.
    Contractors Adjustment Co., 
    166 Ill. 2d 72
    , 77 (1995).
    ¶ 18       Illinois courts have typically treated allegations of negligence in relation to
    insurance policies, such as the negligent procurement claim here, as torts arising
    out of contractual relationships. See, e.g., Hoover, 
    2012 IL App (1st) 110939
    , ¶ 52;
    State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. John J. Rickhoff Sheet Metal Co., 
    394 Ill. App. 3d
    548, 565 (2009); Indiana Insurance Co. v. Machon & Machon, Inc., 324 Ill.
    App. 3d 300, 303-04 (2001). In Kanter v. Deitelbaum, 
    271 Ill. App. 3d 750
    , 755
    (1995), the appellate court characterized this cause of action as “extracontractual.”
    Unlike other torts, the earliest date of accrual for torts arising out of contractual
    relationships is the date of the breach of the duty or the contract, not the date of the
    damages. Indiana Insurance 
    Co., 324 Ill. App. 3d at 304
    ; Hoover, 2012 IL App
    (1st) 110939, ¶ 52; see also Hermitage 
    Corp., 166 Ill. 2d at 77
    .
    ¶ 19       Here the date of the alleged breach was March 21, 2012. On this day Varga
    procured for the Krops an insurance policy that did not cover defamation, invasion
    of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which the Krops alleged
    they had asked Varga to provide.
    -6­
    ¶ 20                                 B. The Discovery Rule
    ¶ 21       The Krops urge the court to apply the “discovery rule.” This rule delays the start
    of the limitations period until the claimant knew or reasonably should have known
    of the injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused. Hermitage Corp., 
    166 Ill. 2d
    at 77; Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 
    88 Ill. 2d 407
    , 414 (1981). Illinois courts
    have applied this rule in certain circumstances to alleviate the harsh consequences
    of statutes of limitations. Knox 
    College, 88 Ill. 2d at 414
    . When a complainant
    should have discovered an injury is a question of fact, but this court can determine
    when the limitations period began if the facts are undisputed and only one answer is
    reasonable. Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 
    158 Ill. 2d 240
    , 250
    (1994).
    ¶ 22       Many Illinois cases have found that insurance customers should know the
    specifics of their policy as soon as they purchase it. The appellate court has
    imposed on insurance customers an obligation to read their policies and understand
    the terms. See, e.g., RVP, LLC v. Advantage Insurance Services, Inc., 2017 IL App
    (3d) 160276, ¶ 32; Garrick v. Mesirow Financial Holdings, Inc., 
    2013 IL App (1st) 122228
    , ¶ 49; 
    Perelman, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1011
    . In Hoover, 
    2012 IL App (1st) 110939
    , the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs should have known the
    specifics of their policy when they first purchased it. The Hoovers had met with
    their insurance agent about adding a section to their existing policy that would
    cover the cost to replace their home and possessions if they were damaged. After an
    explosion destroyed their home, the insurer covered less than 80% of the
    replacement costs because the new section in the Hoovers’ policy specified this
    liability limit. 
    Id. ¶ 17.
    When the Hoovers sued for negligence, the insurer claimed
    that the Hoovers should have known about the liability limit more than two years
    earlier and the suit was untimely. The court agreed with the insurer that the Hoovers
    could have read the policy and known about the liability limit as soon as they
    received the new policy. 
    Id. ¶ 60.
    ¶ 23       The Krops ask this court to disregard these precedents and follow the appellate
    court’s reasoning. The appellate court here applied the discovery rule and delayed
    the start of the limitations period. Krop, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 161071
    , ¶ 16. It cited
    two appellate court cases addressing the statute of limitations for negligent failure
    to procure insurance: Broadnax v. Morrow, 
    326 Ill. App. 3d 1074
    (2002), and
    -7­
    Perelman, 
    298 Ill. App. 3d 1007
    . Krop, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 161071
    , ¶¶ 16, 20. In
    each of these cases, an insurance customer sued an insurance broker claiming
    negligent failure to procure the requested insurance policy. Unlike “captive agents”
    who work for one insurance company exclusively, insurance brokers work for their
    customers and provide insurance policies from multiple companies. Skaperdas,
    
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶ 19. The Broadnax and Perelman courts found that insurance
    brokers owed customers a fiduciary duty. This duty exists in certain relationships
    where “one party places trust in another so that the latter gains superiority and
    influence over the former.” Prime Leasing, Inc. v. Kendig, 
    332 Ill. App. 3d 300
    ,
    313 (2002). In both Broadnax and Perelman, the appellate court found that this
    fiduciary duty imposed a greater obligation on insurance brokers to ensure that
    their customers understood the specifics of their new policies. Broadnax, 326 Ill.
    App. 3d at 1079; 
    Perelman, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1011
    .
    ¶ 24       Following Broadnax and Perelman, the appellate court concluded that barring a
    negligence claim against any insurance producer regardless of when the customer
    discovered the injury would be inconsistent with the fiduciary duty. 2017 IL App
    (1st) 161071, ¶¶ 16, 20, 34-35. It applied the discovery rule to delay the start of the
    limitations period until the Krops learned of the injury and that it was wrongfully
    caused, which it determined was when American Family denied the Krops
    coverage in August 2014. 
    Id. ¶ 35.
    ¶ 25       In addition to Broadnax and Perelman, the Krops and the appellate court relied
    on Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Lakeside Community Committee, 
    2016 IL App (1st) 141845
    . In Scottsdale, the appellate court found that the cause of action accrued
    when the insurer first denied coverage and not when the insured first purchased the
    policy. 
    Id. ¶ 2.
    Scottsdale arose after a young child died while Lakeside
    Community Committee (Lakeside) was providing child welfare services to the
    child and her mother. 
    Id. ¶ 1.
    When the public guardian sued Lakeside for wrongful
    death, Lakeside’s insurer, Scottsdale, denied coverage. 
    Id. ¶ 2.
    Lakeside assigned
    its own claims to the public guardian, which alleged that Scottsdale’s agent
    negligently failed to procure the insurance policy that Lakeside had requested. 
    Id. In rejecting
    Scottsdale’s argument that the statute of limitations barred the claim,
    the appellate court agreed with Broadnax that Lakeside would not have known the
    extent of its coverage until the insurer denied coverage. 
    Id. ¶¶ 31,
    36, 38.
    -8­
    ¶ 26        The Krops’ reliance on Broadnax and Perelman is misplaced. See also 
    id. ¶¶ 29-31,
    38; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
    394 Ill. App. 3d
    at 565-66; General
    Casualty Co. of Illinois v. Carroll Tiling Service, Inc., 
    342 Ill. App. 3d 883
    ,
    899-900 (2003). The court in Broadnax based its decision on the insurance broker’s
    fiduciary duty, but insurance agents do not owe customers a fiduciary duty. At the
    time of the facts in Broadnax and Perelman, such a duty existed for insurance
    brokers, who procured policies for customers but did not work for any one
    insurance company. Skaperdas, 
    2015 IL 117021
    ¶¶ 19, 22; Broadnax, 
    326 Ill. App. 3d
    at 1079; 
    Perelman, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1011
    . In contrast, insurance agents
    worked for a particular company and owed obligations to their employer as well as
    their customer. Skaperdas, 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶¶ 19, 22.
    ¶ 27       In 1997, the General Assembly enacted the Insurance Placement Liability Act.
    Section 2-2201 provides:
    “No cause of action brought by any person or entity against any insurance
    producer, registered firm, or limited insurance representative concerning the
    sale, placement, procurement, renewal, binding, cancellation of, or failure to
    procure any policy of insurance shall subject the insurance producer, registered
    firm, or limited insurance representative to civil liability under standards
    governing the conduct of a fiduciary or a fiduciary relationship except when the
    conduct upon which the cause of action is based involves the wrongful
    retention or misappropriation by the insurance producer, registered firm, or
    limited insurance representative of any money that was received as premiums,
    as a premium deposit, or as payment of a claim.” Pub. Act 82-280 (eff. Jan. 1,
    1997) (enacting 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(b)).
    ¶ 28	   This statute prevents any insurance producer from being held to the fiduciary
    standard, except in a narrow set of circumstances not relevant to this case. 735
    ILCS 5/2-2201(b) (West 2014). Instead insurance producers have only a general
    duty to exercise ordinary care. 
    Id. § 2-2201(a).
    In Skaperdas, this court held that the
    general duty applies to both agents and brokers. 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶¶ 35, 37. This
    statute makes clear that Varga owed no fiduciary obligations to the Krops.
    ¶ 29        Because a claim for negligent failure to procure insurance does not involve a
    fiduciary duty, insurance customers’ obligation to read their policies controls. See
    RVP, LLC, 
    2017 IL App (3d) 160276
    , ¶ 32; Hoover, 
    2012 IL App (1st) 110939
    ,
    -9­
    ¶ 60. Customers generally know their own goals better than their insurance agent
    does, but determining if a policy achieves those goals will be difficult when
    customers do not read the policy. Expecting customers to read their policies and
    understand the terms incentivizes them to act in good faith to purchase the policy
    they actually want, rather than to delay raising an issue until after the insurer has
    already denied coverage. See Hermitage 
    Corp., 166 Ill. 2d at 77
    (noting that cause
    of action for contract actions accrues at moment of breach, not injury). Moreover,
    insurance customers frequently maintain the same insurance policy for years,
    perhaps decades, at a time. If the cause of action did not accrue until the insurance
    producer notified the customer of an uninsured liability, insurance customers
    would benefit from their policy throughout the intervening period, while evidence
    potentially relevant to the insurer’s defense would be at risk of deterioration.
    Therefore, because insurance customers can read their policies and learn of any
    defects, the discovery rule typically will not delay the start of the two-year
    limitations period for negligent failure to procure insurance.
    ¶ 30       Decisions of other state supreme courts support this conclusion. The Rhode
    Island, Indiana, Mississippi, Delaware, and Maine Supreme Courts have agreed
    that insurance customers can learn the extent of their coverage by reading their
    policies. Faber v. McVay, 
    155 A.3d 153
    , 158 (R.I. 2017); Groce v. American
    Family Mutual Insurance Co., 
    5 N.E.3d 1154
    (Ind. 2014); Filip v. Block, 
    879 N.E.2d 1076
    , 1084 (Ind. 2008); Oaks v. Sellers, 2006-IA-00005-SCT (¶ 23) (Miss.
    2007); Kaufman v. C.L. McCabe & Sons, Inc., 
    603 A.2d 831
    , 835 (Del. 1995);
    Chiapetta v. Clark Associates, 
    521 A.2d 697
    , 700 (Me. 1987).
    ¶ 31       Admittedly, the courts of other states are far from unanimous on when the cause
    of action accrues in such cases and when insurance customers should discover their
    potential claims. See Stephens v. Worden Insurance Agency, LLC, 
    859 N.W.2d 723
    , 732-33 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (cataloguing different approaches to the accrual
    date); M.S.S. Construction Corp. v. Century Surety Co., No. 15 Civ. 2801(ER),
    
    2015 WL 6516861
    , at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015) (discussing conflict within
    New York state courts over whether the cause of action accrued at the time of the
    breach or when the insurer first denied coverage).
    ¶ 32       A few courts have taken the Krops’ position that the discovery rule delays the
    limitations period until after the insurance customers learn that they have incurred
    - 10 ­
    expenses from an uninsured liability. Gudenau & Co. v. Sweeney Insurance, Inc.,
    
    736 P.2d 763
    , 767 (Alaska 1987); International Mobiles Corp. v. Corroon &
    Black/Fairfield & Ellis, Inc., 
    560 N.E.2d 122
    , 124 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990);
    American Home Assurance Co. v. Osborn, 
    422 A.2d 8
    , 16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
    1980); Kelly v. H.C. Kerstetter Co., No. 696 MDA 2015, 
    2016 WL 1728686
    , at
    *4-5 (Pa. Super. Ct., Apr. 27, 2016).
    ¶ 33       Some state courts also have found that the cause of action accrues when the
    insured incurs losses because of an uninsured liability, but they reached this
    conclusion without applying a discovery rule. See, e.g., Blumberg v. USAA
    Casualty Insurance Co., 
    790 So. 2d 1061
    , 1065 (Fla. 2001); Hickox v. Stover, 
    551 So. 2d 259
    , 264 (Ala. 1989); 
    Chiapetta, 521 A.2d at 700
    ; Spurlin v. Paul Brown
    Agency, Inc., 
    454 P.2d 963
    (N.M. 1969); see also, LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank &
    London Insurance Agency, 
    152 Ohio St. 3d 517
    , 2018-Ohio-334, 
    98 N.E.3d 241
    ,
    ¶ 40 (DeWine, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor, C.J.) (discussing ambiguities in
    Ohio law but noting Ohio cases holding that the discovery rule does not apply in
    any professional negligence suit); Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco
    Energy, Inc., 
    962 S.W.2d 507
    , 514-15 (Tex. 1998). But cf. Rice v. Louis A.
    Williams & Associates, Inc., 
    86 S.W.3d 329
    , 339-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
    ¶ 34       These courts relied on two key premises: that the injury for which the plaintiffs
    sought a remedy was a liability that their policy did not cover and that the plaintiffs
    could not assert their claim until they encountered such a liability. See, e.g.,
    Gudenau & 
    Co., 736 P.2d at 766
    ; Kelly, 
    2016 WL 1728686
    , at *4; American Home
    Assurance 
    Co., 422 A.2d at 16
    (explaining that the cause of action cannot accrue
    until there is some “legal harm”). The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Austin v.
    Fulton Insurance Co., 
    444 P.2d 536
    (Alaska 1968), is characteristic of this
    approach. Austin explained that the cause of action for a tort cannot accrue until the
    tort is complete, that the tort is not complete until the harm occurs, and that the
    relevant harm was the uninsured liability, not simply the defective policy. 
    Id. at 539.
    This was the background context to which the Alaska Supreme Court applied
    the discovery rule in Gudenau & 
    Co., 736 P.2d at 766
    ; see also Pichowicz v.
    Watson Insurance Agency Inc., 
    768 A.2d 1048
    (N.H. 2001); International Mobiles
    
    Corp., 560 N.E.2d at 124
    ; Williams v. Hilb, Rogal & Hobbs Insurance Services of
    California, Inc., 
    98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910
    , 924 (Ct. App. 2009).
    - 11 ­
    ¶ 35       We reject these premises and instead agree with the Indiana and Delaware
    courts. 
    Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1076
    ; 
    Kaufman, 603 A.2d at 834
    . Because Illinois
    treats negligent failure to procure insurance as a tort arising out of a contract, “the
    cause of action ordinarily accrues at the time of the breach of contract, not when a
    party sustains damages.” Hermitage 
    Corp., 166 Ill. 2d at 77
    . Neither party disputes
    that the breach occurred when Varga delivered the allegedly nonconforming
    policy. See Easterly v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., No.
    2006-CA-001580-MR, 
    2009 WL 350595
    , at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2009).
    Although the discovery rule delays the start of the limitations period until the
    plaintiff should discover the injury, we find that insurance customers are injured as
    soon as an insurance producer delivers a policy that does not conform to the
    customers’ request. The Krops’ alleged injuries included not only their uninsured
    liability in Andreolas’s lawsuit but also their lack of coverage between the purchase
    of the policy in 2012 and the lawsuit in 2014. The damages may have increased
    when Andreolas sued, but the alleged injury began when American Family and
    Varga provided the Krops with an insurance policy that did not conform to their
    request. 
    Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1083
    ; 
    Kaufman, 603 A.2d at 834
    ; see also Restatement
    (Second) of Torts § 7 (1965) (distinguishing between a “harm,” which requires a
    loss or detriment, and the broader “injury,” which may exist without any harm
    occurring); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 
    85 Ill. 2d 161
    , 171 (1981). The
    cause of action accrues as soon as the plaintiff should discover some injury, even if
    the full extent of the injury is not evident. Golla v. General Motors Corp., 
    167 Ill. 2d
    353, 364, 367 (1995).
    ¶ 36       Although customers should read their policy and discover any defects, we
    recognize that there will be a narrow set of cases in which the policyholder
    reasonably could not be expected to learn the extent of coverage simply by reading
    the policy. In some cases the insurance policies may contain contradictory
    provisions or fail to define key terms. In others the circumstances that give rise to
    the liability may be so unexpected that the typical customer should not be expected
    to anticipate how the policy applies. For example, the highly unusual circumstances
    of Scottsdale, involving the murder of a young child in the custody of the
    Department of Children and Family Services, were not likely imagined by
    - 12 ­
    Lakeside when it purchased the policy. 1 Scottsdale, 
    2016 IL App (1st) 141845
    ,
    ¶¶ 36-37; see also 
    Groce, 5 N.E.3d at 1159
    (finding that although “ ‘reasonable
    reliance upon an agent’s representations can override an insured’s duty to read the
    policy,’ ” the insurance agent’s statement that he would have the agreement
    “ ‘written up’ ” was not a sufficient representation to absolve the customers of the
    obligation to read their own policy (quoting 
    Fillip, 879 N.E.2d at 1084
    )).
    ¶ 37       The alleged facts of this case do not present such an exceptional circumstance
    where a customer reasonably should not be expected to understand the terms of the
    policy. The American Family policy covered legal liability only if it resulted from
    “bodily injury or property damage.” The first page of the policy includes a
    “DEFINITIONS” section that explicitly states that “[b]odily [i]njury does not
    include *** emotional or mental distress, mental anguish, mental injury, or any
    similar injury unless it arises out of actual bodily harm to the person.” This clearly
    differs from the Travelers policy, which states that Travelers would provide
    coverage “for damages because of ‘bodily injury,’ ‘personal injury,’ or ‘property
    damage.’ ” The Travelers policy defines “personal injury” to include “[l]ibel,
    slander or defamation of character” and “[i]nvasion of privacy.” The difference
    between the two policies was apparent. These details closely resemble the facts of
    Hoover, where the 80% liability limit was clearly expressed on the face of the
    policy. Hoover, 
    2012 IL App (1st) 110939
    , ¶¶ 58-61.
    ¶ 38       The Krops have not pleaded facts showing that they could not have read their
    American Family policy and understood its terms, so the cause of action accrued
    when they first purchased their policy. The parties agree that American Family
    issued the policy on March 21, 2012. 2 The Krops do not claim that they never
    received the policy or had no copy available to them. Because they were obligated
    to read the policy and understand its terms, this is also the earliest date when they
    1
    Although the Scottsdale court erred by relying on Broadnax, its reasoning based on Indiana
    Insurance Co. and for distinguishing Hoover remains persuasive. Scottsdale, 
    2016 IL App (1st) 141845
    , ¶¶ 36-37.
    2
    The exact date that the Krops received a copy of the American Family policy does not appear
    in the record. However, the Krops do not dispute March 21, 2012, as the date that American Family
    issued the policy, and they do not suggest that they received a copy much later. Even if March 21,
    2012, is not the exact date that they had the opportunity to read the policy, they had the opportunity
    soon after. Whatever exact date the cause of action accrued in spring 2012, the suit in September
    2015 was certainly more than two years after that date.
    - 13 ­
    reasonably should have known that Varga had not provided them with an American
    Family policy that covered all the same liabilities as the Travelers policy. Their
    cause of action against Varga for negligent failure to procure insurance accrued on
    March 21, 2012, and the two-year limitations period ended on March 21, 2014.
    Because the Krops brought their claim on September 3, 2015, that claim was
    untimely.
    ¶ 39                                     CONCLUSION
    ¶ 40       The Krops’ claim was barred by the limitations period for claims against
    insurance producers in section 13-214.4 of the Code. We reverse the appellate
    court’s decision and affirm the circuit court’s order granting Varga’s motion to
    dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code.
    ¶ 41      Appellate court judgment reversed.
    ¶ 42      Circuit court judgment affirmed.
    ¶ 43      JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting:
    ¶ 44       The threshold question in this case is the proper characterization of the
    third-party action filed by the Krops against Andrew Varga, an American Family
    agent, under section 2-2201 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-2201 (West 2014)). When
    this action is properly characterized as a negligence action, it is evident that the
    cause of action accrued upon American Family’s denial of the Krops’ claim for
    coverage. Thus, when the Krops filed their third-party complaint for negligent
    procurement, the two-year limitations period had not run. Accordingly, I would
    affirm the appellate court’s judgment that reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the
    Krops’ cause of action as untimely.
    ¶ 45      The two-year statute of limitations in section 13-214.4 of the Code
    encompasses claims by an insured against an insurance producer, including Varga.
    That section provides that “[a]ll causes of action brought by any person or entity
    under any statute or any legal or equitable theory against an insurance producer ***
    concerning the *** procurement *** of, or failure to procure any policy of
    - 14 ­
    insurance shall be brought within 2 years of the date the cause of action accrues.”
    735 ILCS 5/13-214.4 (West 2014).
    ¶ 46        The accrual date depends upon how the cause of action is characterized.
    Historically, liability for the failure to procure insurance arose under various
    theories of tort and contract, and it often depended on the distinctions between
    insurance brokers and captive insurance agents. In these cases, depending upon the
    relationship, liability was said to be based on the agreement between the
    prospective insured and the insurance broker to procure a certain policy, based on a
    fiduciary relationship with its principal, or based on other negligence principles.
    See, e.g., Scarsdale Villas Associates, Ltd. v. Korman Associates Insurance
    Agency, Inc., 
    178 Ill. App. 3d 261
    , 264 (1988) (action for breach of a contract to
    procure insurance and negligent misrepresentation); Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 
    58 Ill. App. 2d 372
    (1965) (action for breach of a contract to procure); Black v. Illinois
    Fair Plan Ass’n, 
    87 Ill. App. 3d 1106
    , 1110 (1980) (action for negligent
    procurement arising from a breach of fiduciary duties); Talbot v. Country Life
    Insurance Co., 
    8 Ill. App. 3d 1062
    , 1065 (1973) (action for negligent procurement
    based on an affirmative undertaking to perform a service to another to either
    provide the desired coverage or notify the applicant of the rejection of the risk “so
    that he may not be lulled into a feeling of security or put to prejudicial delay in
    seeking protection elsewhere”).
    ¶ 47       In 1996, the General Assembly enacted section 2-2201 of the Code, which
    addressed the liability of insurance producers in relation to the procurement of
    insurance. See Pub. Act 89-638, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1997) (adding 735 ILCS 5/2-2201).
    Section 2-2201(a) imposes negligence liability on an insurance producer, including
    both brokers and captive agents, by imposing a duty to “exercise ordinary care and
    skill in renewing, procuring, binding, or placing the coverage requested by the
    insured or proposed insured.” 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(a) (West 2014); Skaperdas v.
    Country Casualty Insurance Co., 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶ 25. Although the statute
    removed the common-law basis for distinguishing between insurance brokers and
    insurance agents, and limited the scope of breach of fiduciary duty claims, the
    statute does not release an insurance producer from liability for negligence (735
    ILCS 5/2-2201(d) (West 2014)), and subsection (a) specifically provides for a
    cause of action in negligence (id. § 2-2201(a)); Skaperdas, 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶ 24.
    - 15 ­
    ¶ 48       Here, the Krops alleged that Varga was negligent in failing to procure the
    insurance coverage that they requested pursuant to section 2-2201 of the Code. As
    we explained in Skaperdas, the statutory duty of ordinary care arising from
    subsection (a) arises once coverage is “ ‘requested by the insured or proposed
    insured.’ ” Skaperdas, 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶¶ 37, 42 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(a)
    (West 2010)). Once such coverage is requested, insurance producers “exercise
    ordinary care and skill in responding to the request, ‘either by providing the
    desirable coverage or by notifying the applicant of the rejection of the risk.’ ” 
    Id. ¶ 37
    (quoting 
    Talbot, 8 Ill. App. 3d at 1065
    ). If an insurance producer cannot offer
    the coverage requested, it may satisfy the statutory duty by notifying the customer
    to look elsewhere for the requested coverage. 
    Id. ¶ 39.
    We further explained in
    Skaperdas that the duty does not depend upon either a contractual relationship or a
    fiduciary one. 
    Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
    ¶ 49       As a result, where the statute specifically provides for a negligence action, the
    duty as defined in section 2-2201(a) does not depend upon any contractual
    relationship, and the Krops do not seek recovery for mere negligent performance of
    a contractual duty, the proper characterization of their claim is an ordinary
    negligence action, which is a tort-based claim. See, e.g., Melrose Park Sundries,
    Inc. v. Carlini, 
    399 Ill. App. 3d 915
    , 919 (2010) (characterizing and analyzing the
    claim against an insurance producer under section 2-2201 as a negligence action);
    Mercola v. Abdou, 
    223 F. Supp. 3d 720
    , 728-29 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding that the
    provisions of section 2-2201 sound in the language of tort).
    ¶ 50        Next, we must consider when a cause of action accrues for a negligence claim.
    Generally, we have recognized that tort actions have been treated differently than
    contract actions. Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co., 
    166 Ill. 2d 72
    , 77
    (1995). Tort actions generally accrue at the time of injury. 
    Id. (citing West
           American Insurance Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 
    69 Ill. 2d 126
    , 132 (1977)).
    In Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
    2012 IL 112219
    , ¶ 20, this court explained that a
    cause of action “accrues” when “facts exist that authorize the bringing of a cause of
    action. “Thus, a tort cause of action accrues when all of its elements are present,
    i.e., duty, breach, and resulting injury or damage.” 
    Id. (citing Brucker
    v. Mercola,
    
    227 Ill. 2d 502
    , 542 (2007)); see also Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page,
    
    195 Ill. 2d 257
    , 266 (2001) (statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff
    “has the right to invoke the aid of the court to enforce his remedy”); Lobianco, 69
    - 16 ­
    Ill. 2d at 129-30 (cause of action based on tort accrues only when all the elements
    are present: duty, breach, and resulting injury or damage.)
    ¶ 51       Pursuant to our discovery rule, the limitations period is tolled and begins to
    commence when the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
    injury occurred and that it was wrongfully caused. Knox College v. Celotex Corp.,
    
    88 Ill. 2d 407
    , 414 (1981). At that point, the injured person possesses sufficient
    information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on notice
    to make additional inquiries. 
    Id. at 415.
    Neither party disputes the applicability of
    the discovery rule to this cause of action.
    ¶ 52       Thus, as applied in this context, before the tort could become actionable and
    before the limitations period could begin to run, there must be an injury to the
    plaintiff as a consequence of the insurance producer’s alleged negligence that could
    serve as a basis for the recovery of damages. The alleged injury arises when the
    plaintiff sustains a loss for which an insurance claim is not covered but would have
    been covered if the requested insurance had been properly procured or if the
    plaintiff had been timely notified of the rejection of the risk. Under the discovery
    rule, in this case, at the time the Krops received the denial of coverage letter from
    American Family in August 2014, they knew or should have known of their injury
    and that Varga might have been negligent.
    ¶ 53        Although the Krops were not required to know the “full extent” of the injury
    before the statute of limitations was triggered (Golla v. General Motors Corp., 
    167 Ill. 2d
    353, 364 (1995)), prior to the denial of coverage, any injury was purely
    contingent and speculative. See, e.g., Stephens v. Worden Insurance Agency, LLC,
    
    859 N.W.2d 723
    , 733-34 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (negligent procurement claim
    accrues when the insurer denies the insured’s claim because “on that date any
    speculative injury becomes certain, and the elements of the negligence action are
    complete”); International Mobiles Corp. v. Corroon & Black/Fairfield & Ellis,
    Inc., 
    560 N.E.2d 122
    , 124 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (“[i]f no accident produces a
    claim, the failure will have been negligence in the abstract”); see also Austin v.
    Fulton Insurance Co., 
    444 P.2d 536
    , 539 (Ala. 1968) (until there was a loss for
    which the plaintiff was not protected, no legally protected interest had been
    invaded).
    - 17 ­
    ¶ 54       Accordingly, taking the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable
    to the Krops, as required under section 2-619 of the Code (Porter v. Decatur
    Memorial Hospital, 
    227 Ill. 2d 343
    , 352 (2008)), their cause of action accrued in
    August 2014, when their claim for coverage under their homeowner’s insurance
    policy was denied. When they filed their third-party complaint in September 2015,
    the two-year limitations period had not yet run.
    ¶ 55       Instead of applying these well-settled accrual principles in negligence actions,
    the majority applies accrual theories relating to contracts and “torts arising out of
    contractual relationships” to conclude that the Krops’ cause of action accrued at the
    time of the breach. Supra ¶¶ 17-18, 35. To support this theory, the majority relies
    primarily on a series of cases involving causes of action against insurance
    producers, including Hoover v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 
    2012 IL App (1st) 110939
    , ¶ 52; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. John J. Rickhoff Sheet Metal Co.,
    
    394 Ill. App. 3d
    548, 565 (2009); and Indiana Insurance Co. v. Machon & Machon,
    Inc., 
    324 Ill. App. 3d 300
    , 303-04 (2001).
    ¶ 56        Although those cases indeed use this hybrid term of a “tort arising out of a
    contractual relationship,” like the majority, none of these cases explain the
    doctrinal underpinnings of such a cause of action or explain the contours of these
    types of hybrid claims in the context of section 2-2201. The Hoover and State Farm
    cases rely on the Machon case. Machon involved a contractual relationship
    between an insurer and its agent. Machon, in turn, relies primarily on Lobianco, 
    69 Ill. 2d 126
    . Lobianco was not a case involving insurance producers or the negligent
    procurement of insurance. Lobianco relies, in turn, on the nineteenth-century case
    of Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 
    144 Ill. 197
    (1893),
    involving common carriers for hire and their negligent conduct in transporting
    certain goods. Additionally, the majority relies on Hermitage 
    Corp., 166 Ill. 2d at 77
    , where this court relied on Lobianco, in a case where the parties agreed that a
    negligence claim arose out of a breach of an oral contract, in considering the
    five-year statute of limitations on unwritten contracts. The majority fails to
    recognize that none of these cases inform our analysis here.
    ¶ 57      Significantly, the majority never identifies a contract from which this
    negligence action arises. The majority does not suggest that the contract at issue is
    - 18 ­
    the insurance policy itself. Nor has it identified any conduct that would constitute a
    contract.
    ¶ 58       Furthermore, neither the majority opinion nor the cases it relies upon explain
    how applying this hybrid cause of action and contract accrual principles would
    survive the economic loss doctrine in this context. In Moorman Manufacturing Co.
    v. National Tank Co., 
    91 Ill. 2d 69
    , 86 (1982), this court held that generally a
    plaintiff cannot recover in tort for solely economic losses, limiting recovery to
    contract damages. This doctrine has been applied to liability premised on the mere
    negligent performance of a contractual obligation where the duty is defined by the
    contract executed with the client. See 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Ass’n
    v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 
    136 Ill. 2d 302
    , 317 (1990). However, we have
    explained that, where the duties owed arise outside of the contract, the plaintiff may
    seek recovery in tort for breach of those independent duties. Congregation of the
    Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 
    159 Ill. 2d 137
    , 162 (1994).
    The majority has made no effort to fit this hybrid cause of action and its application
    of contract accrual principles into any exception to the economic loss doctrine.
    ¶ 59       With no attempt by the case law to explain why contract accrual principles
    apply to a negligent procurement claim under section 2-2201, it appears that prior
    cases chose this analytical framework on purely public policy grounds. Hermitage,
    for example, expressed the “concern that plaintiffs will delay bringing suit after a
    contract is breached in order to increase damages.” Hermitage, 
    166 Ill. 2d
    at 77.
    However, in adopting section 2-2201(a), the legislature has expressed the public
    policy of this state to be that insurance producers, whether brokers or captive
    agents, have a duty of ordinary care and that liability rests in negligence principles,
    allowing recovery in tort. 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(d) (West 2014) (“the provisions of
    this [s]ection do not limit or release an insurance producer *** from liability for
    negligence concerning the *** procurement *** or failure to procure any policy of
    insurance”).
    ¶ 60       As a matter of statutory interpretation, we must construe the language as written
    without reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not
    express. Moon v. Rhode, 
    2016 IL 119572
    , ¶ 22. Nothing in the language of section
    2-2201 suggests that the cause of action is a “tort arising out of a contractual
    relationship” or implicates contract theories. We cannot read these contract ideas
    - 19 ­
    into the plain language of the statute. Indeed, we explained in Skaperdas that the
    duties owed under section 2-2201 do not depend upon any contract. Skaperdas,
    
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶ 25. Nor can we add language to the statute of limitations as
    provided in section 13-214.4. Nothing in the language of that section suggests that
    the legislature meant to incorporate contract accrual principles. 735 ILCS
    5/13-214.4 (West 2014).
    ¶ 61       The suspect logic in the majority’s opinion is laid bare by its reliance on
    Hermitage. Recognizing that the statute of limitations does not define what
    constitutes accrual, the majority relies on Hermitage as authority to “fill this gap”
    in the statute. Supra ¶ 17. The language quoted from Hermitage is accurate but
    ignores the context.
    ¶ 62       The Hermitage case involved a claim by a mechanic’s lienholder who sued the
    preparer of the lien for negligence, negligent and unauthorized practice of law,
    consumer fraud, and breach of warranty. Hermitage, 
    166 Ill. 2d
    at 75-76. The
    parties agreed that these common-law theories, other than fraud, arose from an oral
    contract for services to which a five year statute of limitations applied. 
    Id. at 76.
           The causes of action were not based on any statute.
    ¶ 63       Unlike Hermitage, in this case, there is no gap to be filled. Section 2-2201
    simply articulates a cause of action for negligence. Under the statute, the Krops
    presented a cause of action for negligence, and the statute of limitations for that
    claim was triggered by normal negligence accrual principles.
    ¶ 64       Furthermore, the majority concludes that the discovery rule will typically not
    delay the accrual period because an insurance customer’s duty to read the policy
    generally acts to put the customer on notice of the injury. This conclusion is
    premised on the erroneous notion that the injury accrues when the plaintiff is issued
    a policy that does not cover all of the possible contingent future liability that would
    have been covered under the requested policy. As explained, the breach itself is not
    actionable. No negligent procurement action could arise until there was a loss for
    which an insurance claim was made and denied because, until that moment, there
    could be no actual damages.
    ¶ 65       Although the accrual issue has received diverse treatment in other jurisdictions,
    to hold that the date the injury accrues is the date of the negligent act allows the
    - 20 ­
    cause of action to be barred before any actionable injury resulted. If plaintiffs had
    brought suit in 2012 when they received the allegedly defective policy, their
    complaint would not have survived a section 2-615 motion to dismiss because no
    actual damages had yet occurred. Under the majority’s view, the cause of action for
    negligent procurement by an insurance producer under section 2-2201 is essentially
    a dead letter if the underlying liability claim is not brought within two years from
    the date the policy was issued.
    ¶ 66       Under these circumstances, the statute of limitations essentially becomes a
    statute of repose, contrary to the legislative intent of section 13-214.4. 735 ILCS
    5/13-214.4 (West 2014). Had the legislature sought this outcome, it could have
    drafted the statute of limitations to expressly state that a cause of action concerning
    an insurance producer’s procurement of insurance shall be brought within two
    years of the date the policy of insurance was issued. It did not do so.
    ¶ 67       Whether a corresponding duty to read the policy may be alleged as an
    affirmative defense to a claim for negligent procurement is a separate question,
    involving the merits of plaintiffs’ cause of action. However, the majority’s
    conclusion eviscerates the duty of the insurance producer to notify a prospective
    insured of the rejection of the risk. Skaperdas, 
    2015 IL 117021
    , ¶ 37. Moreover,
    whether the deficiencies in a policy are readily apparent from reading it may
    involve questions for the trier of fact, including the sophistication of the insured
    and the complexity of the policy. These questions, however, are not at issue here on
    a motion to dismiss.
    ¶ 68       In sum, this is a tort action and should be analyzed under the proper tort
    framework. Interpreting the cause of action in this manner effectuates the statute’s
    legislative intent to impose this legal duty as a matter of policy. To construe the
    cause of action as a tort arising out of a contractual relationship defeats the purpose
    of section 2-2201 by rendering negligence actions against insurance producers for
    failure to procure requested insurance an illusory form of recovery for resulting
    damage that ensues. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
    ¶ 69      JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.
    - 21 ­
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 122556

Citation Numbers: 2018 IL 122556, 120 N.E.3d 982, 427 Ill. Dec. 915

Filed Date: 10/18/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (26)

Hickox v. Stover , 551 So. 2d 259 ( 1989 )

Gudenau & Co., Inc. v. Sweeney Ins., Inc. , 736 P.2d 763 ( 1987 )

Kean v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 235 Ill. 2d 351 ( 2009 )

Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hospital , 227 Ill. 2d 343 ( 2008 )

Austin v. Fulton Insurance Company , 444 P.2d 536 ( 1968 )

Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. , 790 So. 2d 1061 ( 2001 )

Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos , 85 Ill. 2d 161 ( 1981 )

Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page , 195 Ill. 2d 257 ( 2001 )

Golla v. General Motors Corp. , 167 Ill. 2d 353 ( 1995 )

Knox College v. Celotex Corp. , 88 Ill. 2d 407 ( 1981 )

Kedzie and 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge , 156 Ill. 2d 112 ( 1993 )

Skaperdas v. Country Casualty Insurance Company , 2015 IL 117021 ( 2015 )

Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG , 2012 IL 112219 ( 2012 )

Moon v. Rhode , 2016 IL 119572 ( 2017 )

King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp. , 215 Ill. 2d 1 ( 2005 )

Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co. , 166 Ill. 2d 72 ( 1995 )

2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel ... , 136 Ill. 2d 302 ( 1990 )

Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer , 158 Ill. 2d 240 ( 1994 )

West American Insurance v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co. , 69 Ill. 2d 126 ( 1977 )

Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross & Co. , 159 Ill. 2d 137 ( 1994 )

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