Robinson v. Southern Pacific Co. , 105 Cal. 526 ( 1895 )

Beatty, C. J.

The three principal questions arising in this case were very fully and elaborately argued by counsel, both' orally and in the printed briefs filed prior to its submission, and they were as carefully considered in0the opinion of the court heretofore filed, wherein it was held: 1. That section 490 of the Civil Code is still in force; 2. That it confers stopover privileges upon the holders of the tickets therein provided for; and 3. That the defendant is subject to its provisions. As to these points, our views remain unchanged, and nothing further need be said concerning them. The rehearing, indeed, was ordered with special reference to a question which, although it had been stated in the briefs, had not been discussed at the oral argument, and had been but slightly considered in the opinion of the court. This question, to which the reargument was practically confined, may be briefly stated as follows: Did the plaintiff, by purchasing and accepting a ticket which, in terms and in fact, gave him the alternative right to go to Oakland or Alameda, become thereby entitled to go to Oakland, stop off there, and afterwards resume his journey to Alameda? When this question is considered in the light of the principles established by our former ■decision, and with reference to the facts stated in the ■opinion and other facts appearing in the record, it is -of comparatively easy solution. The defendant had a ferry and railroad line which it was operating between the foot of Market street, in San Francisco, and the -city of Alameda, and which passed through the city of Oakland, where there was a station at which passengers were accustomed to enter and leave its cars. The fact that defendant had another and more direct line of road (and ferry) between the same termini did not relieve it of its statutory obligation to fix (either alone or in conjunction with the railroad commission) a regular passenger rate by the longer route. The right to operate the road and the obligation to fix such regular rate are correlative. It had, in fact, complied with the statute, and fixed the rate at fifteen cents, and this was well known, not only to the plaintiff, but to the public generally. Such being the case, the plaintiff, desiring to go from San Francisco to Alameda via Oakland, tendered the regular fare, and demanded the ticket which it was the duty of the defendant to furnish. rHe received a ticket in the form set out in our original opinion, which was the only ticket the defendant was accustomed to issue to passengers desiring to go by either of two routes to Oakland, or either of two other routes to Alameda. But the fact that the ticket gave the plaintiff his choice of these various routes and different destinations made it none the less effective as a, ticket from San Francisco to Alameda via Oakland. What he wanted was a ticket of that particular kind, with all the lawful privileges thereto attached, and it was not in the power of the defendant to deprive him of such privileges by offering him other privileges in exchange. This conclusion does not involve the consequences that are apprehended by counsel for appellant. We do not hold, and it does not follow from the views herein expressed, or from any thing decided or said by way of argument in our original opinion, that there can be no ticket sold on any line of road which is not a stopover ticket. We only hold that there must be a regular passenger rate established from one depot to another, and that a passenger who tenders the regular fare is entitled to a ticket to his place of destination, which ticket, under the law, gives him a right to stop over at an intermediate station. And the railroad company cannot demand the regular rate, and at the same time deny the privilege which the law confers upon all who pay such rate. If, in consideration of an abatement from the regular established rate, a passenger voluntarily accepts an excursion or other limited ticket, an entirely different case is presented. Here the regular established fare was tendered and accepted, and a ticket issued, which was the only ticket a passenger from San Francisco to Alameda via Oakland could obtain—the only ticket provided by the defendant. This being so, the defendant cannot be permitted to say that it was not the ticket which the statute obliged it to provide and issue, .and this is more especially true in view of the fact that it contained nothing which in terms denied or assumed to curtail the rights conferred by the statute.

Bat it is said that the ticket is not the contract; that at is a mere token or voucher, and that it is the duty of the passenger to inform himself of the rules and regulations of the carrier, which really determine his rights. This is, perhaps, true to a certain extent. But the passenger is not bound to take notice of any rule or regulation which contravenes the law of the land. So far as the law fixes the terms of the contract it cannot be varied by rules of the company, known or unknown, ■unless assented to by the passenger. We have held that under the law of California the ticket issued by a railroad company upon receipt of the regular fare from one depot to another gives the holder the right to stop over at an intermediate station, and to resume his journey at any time within six months; and, if this is so, it matters not how well it may be known to a particular passenger that this right is contested or denied by the company. He nevertheless acquires, by payment of the regular fare, all the rights which the statute gives him. The passenger who is informed of the claim and practice of the carrier is in no worse position than one who is not informed. So far as the law goes it protects all alike. These views are conclusive of the question submitted for reargument, and for the reasons here stated, and those set forth in the original opinion, the judgment and order of the superior court are affirmed;

Garoutte, J., Harrison, J., Van Fleet, J., Fitzgerald, J., and De Haven, J., concurred.