Ginny Lambert v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 16 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GINNY LYN LAMBERT                               No.    19-35360
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01235-AA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 12, 2022**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: WATFORD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and AMON,*** District
    Judge.
    Ginny Lyn Lambert appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    Page 2 of 4
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her applications for disability
    insurance benefits and supplemental security insurance benefits under Titles II and
    XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and
    
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). We affirm.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s)
    decision to give “little weight” to the opinion of Lambert’s treating neurologist, Dr.
    Rodrigo Lim, that Lambert was “permanently disabled.” Dr. Lim’s opinion was
    contradicted by other doctors’ opinions, and the ALJ offered “specific and
    legitimate” reasons supported by the record for discounting it. Bayliss v. Barnhart,
    
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ set out “a detailed and thorough
    summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating [her] interpretation
    thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 
    881 F.2d 747
    , 751 (9th Cir.
    1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ properly evaluated
    Dr. Lim’s opinion in relation to other medical evidence, including the opinion of
    consulting doctor Richard Alley that Lambert was capable of light work.
    The ALJ also described at length how Lambert’s actual functioning
    exceeded the limits to be expected on the basis of Dr. Lim’s opinion, and she
    identified inconsistencies in Lambert’s testimony that suggested Lambert could
    Page 3 of 4
    function beyond the limitations reported by Dr. Lim. An ALJ may discount a
    treating physician’s opinion where a claimant’s testimony or her activities conflict
    with the opinion. Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    169 F.3d 595
    , 601–02 (9th
    Cir. 1999). Any error in the ALJ’s remaining reasons for discounting Dr. Lim’s
    opinion was harmless. See Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    454 F.3d 1050
    ,
    1054–56 (9th Cir. 2006).
    2. Contrary to Lambert’s contention, the ALJ did not improperly omit from
    her residual functional capacity (RFC) a limitation on her social interaction that
    was identified by agency psychologists. The ALJ is “responsible for translating
    and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc.
    Sec. Admin., 
    807 F.3d 996
    , 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Stubbs-Danielson v.
    Astrue, 
    539 F.3d 1169
    , 1174 (9th Cir. 2008)). In limiting Lambert to “superficial
    interaction with coworkers and the public,” the RFC reasonably translated a
    limitation that the agency psychologists described as permitting “occasional and
    brief contact w[ith] the public or co-workers.”
    3. Finally, substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
    Lambert could return to her past work as a cashier. Lambert cites Zavalin v.
    Colvin, 
    778 F.3d 842
    , 846–47 (9th Cir. 2015), in which we held that there is an
    Page 4 of 4
    apparent conflict between an RFC limited to simple and repetitive tasks and the
    demands of the cashier job, which requires Level 3 Reasoning. Unlike the ALJ in
    Zavalin, however, the ALJ here addressed the conflict. The ALJ’s conclusion that
    Lambert was capable of Level 3 Reasoning is supported by substantial evidence
    because, in addition to Lambert’s education and work history, the ALJ relied on
    her own finding that no record evidence suggested that Lambert could not function
    at that level.
    AFFIRMED.