Jack Graham v. American Golf Corporation , 418 F. App'x 634 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 04 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JACK W. GRAHAM, No. 09-56769
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-04794-RGK-
AJW
v.
AMERICAN GOLF CORPORATION; et MEMORANDUM *
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2011 **
Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jack W. Graham appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
civil rights and antitrust action challenging a policy that permits only American
Golf Corporation (“AGC”) employees to teach golf at certain public golf courses.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Knievel v.
ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Graham’s First Amendment claim
because the golf courses are nonpublic fora and the policy is reasonable and
viewpoint neutral. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (on public property that is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication, the state may restrict speech so long as the
restriction is reasonable and viewpoint neutral).
The district court properly dismissed Graham’s equal protection claim
because he does not have a fundamental right to work as a golf instructor, and there
is a rational basis for the policy. See Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253
(9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he right to pursue a calling is not a fundamental right for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Graham’s Sherman Act claim because
he failed to allege “a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated either by
appellees’ general business activities or by the alleged antitrust violations
themselves[.]” Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted) (purchase of out-of-state supplies and equipment insufficient to
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substantially effect interstate commerce).
Graham’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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