Shawncey Blake v. Santa Clara Department of Corr , 618 F. App'x 328 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 28 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAWNCEY BLAKE, No. 14-17205
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:14-cv-02568-JSW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SANTA CLARA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 21, 2015**
Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Shawncey Blake, an inmate at Santa Clara County Jail, appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick
v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Blake’s claims against defendant
Nguyen because Blake failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Nguyen was
deliberately indifferent to Blake’s back injury. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a
plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief); Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she “knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Blake’s claims against the remaining
defendants because Blake failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any
defendant had a policy or custom that amounted to deliberate indifference, and that
the policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional
violation. See Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185-94 (explaining municipal liability under
§ 1983).
We do not consider Blake’s arguments and allegations raised for the first
time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per
2 14-17205
curiam).
Blake’s pending requests and motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-17205