Edwin Jonas, III v. Emilie Richardson , 645 F. App'x 541 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                 MAR 23 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    EDWIN RITTER JONAS, III, Esquire,                No. 14-35282
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 9:13-cv-00030-DLC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    EMILIE RICHARDSON; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 15, 2016**
    Before:        GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Edwin Ritter Jonas, III, Esq., appeals pro se from the district court’s
    summary judgment in his diversity action alleging defamation. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Szajer v. City of Los
    Angeles, 
    632 F.3d 607
    , 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment because Jonas failed
    to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the newspaper article at
    issue was false. See Shoen v. Shoen, 
    48 F.3d 412
    , 417 (9th Cir. 1995)
    (constitutional elements of defamation); Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Wolf Point v.
    Moe Motor Co., 
    813 P.2d 400
    , 404 (Mont. 1991) (“[T]ruth is a complete defense to
    a claim of defamation.”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Jonas’s filings
    submitted in violation of local rules. See United States v. Heller, 
    551 F.3d 1108
    ,
    1111 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jonas’s Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 56(d) motion because Jonas failed to show how allowing additional
    discovery would have precluded summary judgment. See Tatum v. City & County
    of San Francisco, 
    441 F.3d 1090
    , 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of
    review).
    We reject as without merit Jonas’s contentions relating to the district court’s
    denial of Jonas’s request for judicial notice and for an oral hearing regarding his
    objection to other judicially noticeable documents.
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                    14-35282