Mandreel Smith v. Elin Valenzuela , 667 F. App'x 627 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 29 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANDREEL SMITH, No. 14-56064
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:13-cv-02138-MMM-
SH
v.
ELIN VALENZUELA, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 6, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, W. FLETCHER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Mandreel Smith appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his federal
habeas petition as untimely under the one-year limitation period established in
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We vacate and
remand.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
In 2010, the California Department of Corrections found Smith guilty of
distributing a controlled substance and stripped him of 180 days of good-time
credit. Smith filed successive administrative appeals, the last of which was denied
on March 10, 2011. After unsuccessfully appealing the administrative decision
through the California courts, Smith filed a federal habeas petition on October 30,
2013.
The magistrate judge determined that § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period
began to run on March 11, 2011, and recommended dismissing Smith’s petition as
untimely. The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation in a
one-paragraph order. We agree with the district court’s determination that Smith’s
one-year limitation period began to run on March 11, 2011. See Redd v. McGrath,
343 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2004). However, our case law requires the district court to consider a
petitioner’s equitable tolling arguments when the petitioner alleges facts that would
entitle him to relief. See United States v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 892 (9th Cir.
2011); Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, because there were
some circumstances consistent with Smith’s equitable tolling claims, the magistrate
judge and the district court should have done more than summarily reject them. We
therefore remand this case to the district court so that it may develop the factual
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record as it relates to Smith’s equitable tolling claims and consider in the first
instance whether Smith’s petition, with whatever tolling is appropriate, satisfies §
2244(d)’s one-year limitation period.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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