Radu Grumazescu v. Loretta Lynch , 668 F. App'x 318 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 23 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RADU DANIEL GRUMAZESCU, No. 15-72334
Petitioner, Agency No. A078-849-685
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 16, 2016**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Radu Daniel Grumazescu, a native and citizen of Romania, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by
8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings and review
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
de novo questions of law. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010).
We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Grumazescu is
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) due to having procured admission
through a fraudulent marriage, where the government presented clear and
convincing evidence that he did not intend to establish a life with his United States
citizen wife at the inception of their marriage. See Nakamoto v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d
874, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2004) (in determining whether an alien entered into a
marriage for the purpose of procuring admission into the U.S., the focus of the
inquiry is whether the couple intended to establish a life together at the time they
were married; this court must affirm the IJ’s ruling unless the evidence is “so
compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the facts were as [the
alien] alleged”).
The BIA did not err in considering evidence after the time of Grumazescu’s
marriage, because such evidence may “bear on the subjective intent of the parties
at the time they were married.” Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1148
(9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Grumazescu’s contention that the BIA improperly shifted the burden of
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proof onto him is not supported by the record.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Grumazescu’s unexhausted contentions that
the agency improperly relied on evidence in an arrest report, that he was not given
a proper individualized inquiry because his case was part of a series of cases
regarding alleged marriage fraud, and that the IJ improperly shifted the burden of
proof onto him. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674,
678 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Section] 1252(d)(1) mandates exhaustion and therefore
generally bars us, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, from reaching the merits
of a legal claim not presented in administrative proceedings below.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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