Matthew Beckstrand v. Thomas Read , 680 F. App'x 609 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 13 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW BECKSTRAND, No. 14-15900
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
1:11-cv-00597-SOM-BMK
v.
THOMAS READ and NETTIE MEMORANDUM*
SIMMONS,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DOES 1 - 10,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Susan Oki Mollway, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 21, 2017**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: KOZINSKI, HAWKINS, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Matthew Beckstrand appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Thomas Read and Nettie Simmons. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in granting Read and Simmons’ motion for
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Hawaii’s two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions applies to Beckstrand’s claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 (“Actions for the recovery of
compensation for damage or injury to persons or property shall be instituted within
two years after the cause of action accrued . . . .”); Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d
650, 653 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations,
federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury
claims.”) (citation omitted). Although state law determines the applicable
limitations period, federal law governs when claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
accrue. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). “Under federal law, ‘a
claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which
is the basis of the action.’” Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1999)). Beckstrand
alleges he was told by Simmons in October 2008 that the Hawaii Department of
Public Safety would not honor the credit for time served that Beckstrand claims he
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was owed. Beckstrand could have filed an action for declaratory relief as soon as
he learned from Simmons that the Hawaii Department of Public Safety allegedly
miscalculated the end date of his parole. Beckstrand instead filed suit against Read
and Simmons on September 30, 2011. Because Beckstrand filed his suit against
Read and Simmons more than two years after he learned the Hawaii Department of
Public Safety would not honor the credit for time served he claims he was owed,
the applicable statute of limitations bars his claims.
2. Even if the statute of limitations did not bar Beckstrand’s claims, Read
and Simmons would be entitled to qualified immunity. Read and Simmons
calculated the end date of Beckstrand’s parole in accordance with the Hawaii
statute and Hawaii Supreme Court precedent governing the application of credit for
time served. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-671(3) (2012); State v. March, 11 P.3d
1094, 1099 (Haw. 2000) (“[A] sentence that credits [a defendant] with the time
served for an unrelated offense is illegal because the sentencing court is not
authorized by chapter 706 to grant such a credit.”). “[W]hen a public official acts
in reliance on a duly enacted statute or ordinance, that official is entitled to
qualified immunity.” Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623 F.3d 945, 965
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir.
1999)). Although the district court erred in holding that Read and Simmons would
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not be entitled to qualified immunity, the district court did not err in granting Read
and Simmons’ motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
AFFIRMED.
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