Kamlesh Banga v. Allstate Insurance Company , 689 F. App'x 876 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 25 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KAMLESH BANGA, No. 14-17147
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01518-MCE-EFB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Kamlesh Banga appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging, among other things, violations under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Banga’s
request for oral argument, set forth in her opening and reply briefs, is denied.
Banga has waived her appeal of the dismissal of her UCL claim because she
did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to construe her UCL
claim narrowly, and affirmatively requested, in her opposition to Allstate Insurance
Company’s objections to the magistrate’s findings and recommendation, that the
district court adopt the recommendation without any qualification or reservation.
See Loher v. Thomas, 825 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2016) (setting forth the
standard for finding a waiver of the right to review on appeal and finding that a
party’s failure to object to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation and
its affirmative invitation to adopt the recommendation constituted a waiver of an
issue on appeal).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banga’s request
made in the Fourth Amended Complaint that she be permitted to proceed on the
UCL claim based on the unfair and fraudulent prongs because the entire UCL
claim had already been dismissed and Banga failed to provide any explanation for
why leave to amend should have been granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);
Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 677 (9th Cir. 1993)
(setting forth standard of review and holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying leave to amend where appellants gave no indication of a
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desire to seek leave to amend until after the district court rendered its decision
dismissing the claim).
AFFIRMED.
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