Robert Seiden v. Frazer Frost, LLP ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 3 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROBERT W. SEIDEN, RECEIVER FOR                  No.   18-56176
    CHINA VALVES TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            8:18-cv-0588-CJC (KESx)
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    FRAZER FROST, LLP; MOORE
    STEPHENS WURTH AND TORBERT,
    LLP; FRAZER, LLP; and FROST, PLLC,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 9, 2019
    Pasadena, California
    Before: N.R. SMITH and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District
    Judge.
    Robert Seiden, Receiver for China Valves Technology, Inc. (“CVVT”),
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    Page 2 of 4
    appeals the dismissal of his claims against Frazer Frost, LLP; Moore Stephens
    Wurth and Torbert, LLP; Frazer, LLP; and Frost, PLLC (collectively, “Frazer
    Frost”). The district court held that Seiden’s claims were time-barred by the
    applicable statutes of limitations. On appeal, Seiden renews his argument that,
    because CVVT was controlled by wrongdoers until the statutes of limitations ran,
    his claims against Frazer Frost—CVVT’s accounting firm—were equitably tolled
    until Seiden’s appointment as Receiver for CVVT in September 2016. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    1. This case turns on the proper interpretation of the adverse domination
    doctrine. As the district court recognized, a corporate plaintiff or its representative
    (arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled under the doctrine of adverse
    domination) must show complete control by its corrupt insiders, such that discovery
    of their wrongdoing is impossible. Smith v. Superior Court, 
    266 Cal. Rptr. 253
    , 255
    (Ct. App. 1990); Admiralty Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 
    191 Cal. Rptr. 753
    , 758–59
    (Ct. App. 1983); Burt v. Irvine Co., 
    47 Cal. Rptr. 392
    , 417 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). We
    have held that tolling pursuant to adverse domination is unavailable where discovery
    of the alleged bad acts is possible, notwithstanding complete control by wrongdoers.
    See Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified Sav. Bank, 
    948 F.2d 556
    , 565–66 (9th
    Cir. 1991).
    Seiden argues that California Union was wrongly decided because it failed to
    Page 3 of 4
    follow Whitten v. Dabney, 
    154 P. 312
     (Cal. 1915), which he claims stands for the
    proposition that equitable tolling under the doctrine of adverse domination applies
    whenever a corporation is controlled by corrupt insiders. This argument fails for two
    reasons. First, even if we agreed with Seiden, a three-judge panel of this court is not
    at liberty to overrule California Union’s construction of California law. Second, we
    disagree that there is any tension between Whitten and California Union’s
    interpretation of the adverse domination doctrine. In Whitten, certain shareholders
    and directors conspired to defraud the corporation they controlled, and “sedulously
    concealed” their self-dealing from innocent shareholders. 
    154 P. at 315
    . On these
    facts, the California Supreme Court held that director malfeasance tolled the statute
    of limitations for an innocent shareholder’s claim, filed promptly after that
    shareholder’s discovery of the wrongdoing. 
    Id.
     at 314–16. That is perfectly
    consistent with California Union.
    Turning to this case, uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that, well within
    the statute of limitations, CVVT’s shareholders discovered or should have
    discovered the wrongdoing Seiden alleges. Specifically, in 2011, the same year a
    Citron Research report publicized CVVT’s alleged wrongdoing, shareholders sought
    redress in a class-action lawsuit against both CVVT and Frazer Frost, as well as a
    derivative lawsuit against CVVT. In 2014, the SEC filed a fraud action against
    CVVT. As the district court observed, “[t]he SEC had the ability to uncover the facts
    Page 4 of 4
    relevant to Plaintiff’s causes of actions and make them public.” Seiden v. Frazer
    Frost, LLP, No. 8:18-00588-CJC (KESx), 
    2018 WL 6137618
    , at *6 (C.D. Cal. July
    31, 2018). Indeed, all of these actions implicated Frazer Frost in the wrongdoing
    Seiden now alleges. Accordingly, the district court properly held that adverse
    domination did not toll Seiden’s claims. Cf. Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
    Co., 
    727 F.2d 873
    , 876–79 (9th Cir. 1984).
    2. The district court also properly held that CVVT shareholders were able to
    seek redress for the wrongdoing Seiden alleges here. Seiden argues that
    notwithstanding Frazer Frost’s wrongdoing, shareholders had no ability to sue
    Frazer Frost prior to his appointment as Receiver because Frazer Frost would have
    had an ironclad in pari delicto defense. Seiden is incorrect. Even if Frazer Frost had
    a plausible in pari delicto defense against derivative claims brought by CVVT
    shareholders, defenses—hypothetical or otherwise—do not toll otherwise applicable
    statutes of limitations.
    3. The district court correctly determined that Seiden’s failure to plead adverse
    domination could not be cured by any amendment.
    AFFIRMED.