Victor Fenesan v. William Barr ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 11 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VICTOR RAUL FENESAN,                            No.    18-71833
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A098-392-080
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 8, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,***
    District Judge.
    Victor Raul Fenesan, a native and citizen of Romania, petitions for review of
    a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District Judge
    for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    judge’s (“IJ”) determination that he is removable under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(3)(B)(iii)
    and ineligible for an 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(H) waiver. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the petition.
    Where, as here, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s analysis and conclusion but also
    included its own analysis, we review both decisions. See Vazquez-Hernandez v.
    Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1053
    , 1054 (9th Cir. 2010). We review factual findings related to
    an applicant’s removability under the substantial evidence standard. See Sang Yoon
    Kim v. Holder, 
    603 F.3d 1100
    , 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo the
    disposition of questions of law. Vilchez v. Holder, 
    682 F.3d 1195
    , 1198 (9th Cir.
    2012).
    As a threshold matter, Fenesan argues that the immigration court did not have
    jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because his initial notice to appear did not
    specify the time and date of his hearing as allegedly required by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1229
    (a).
    This Court has already rejected this precise argument. See Karingithi v. Whitaker,
    
    913 F.3d 1158
     (9th Cir. 2019). In Karingithi, we held that the immigration court’s
    jurisdiction is governed by federal immigration regulations, not § 1229(a), and those
    regulations do not require the inclusion of the date and time of the hearing on the
    notice to appear. 913 F.3d at 1160. Thus, the immigration court had jurisdiction over
    Fenesan’s removal proceedings.
    2
    We do not disturb the BIA’s determination that Fenesan is removable under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(3)(B)(iii) because he was convicted of violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 1546
    (a). Fenesan does not dispute that he was convicted of violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 1546
    (a); rather, he contends that his conviction does not constitute a removable
    offense under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(3)(B)(iii). He argues that the heading of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(3)(B)—“Failure to register or falsification of documents”—limits
    removability under the subsection to aliens convicted of “failing to register” or
    “falsifying documents.” He claims that his conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1546
    (a) for
    obtaining an immigrant visa through fraud does not fall within either category. The
    BIA properly found this argument contrary to the plain language of the statute, which
    unambiguously renders removable any alien convicted of a violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1546
    . See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 
    331 U.S. 519
    , 528-29
    (1947) (“[H]eadings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed
    provisions of the text … they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.”)
    (internal citations omitted); Castro-Espinosa v. Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1130
    , 1132 (9th
    Cir. 2001) (stating that a parenthetical did not limit the statutory provision but simply
    describes the type of offenses included in the statute).
    Nor do we disturb the BIA’s determination that Fenesan is ineligible for
    waiver under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(H) as this Court has already determined that
    3
    removability under § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii) is not waivable by § 1227(a)(1)(H). Taggar
    v. Holder, 
    736 F.3d 886
    , 890-91 (9th Cir. 2013).
    Petition for review is DENIED.
    4