Lonnie Williams, Jr. v. Daniel Paramo ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LONNIE CLARK WILLIAMS, JR., No. 18-55284
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB
v.
DANIEL PARAMO, Warden; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Barry Ted Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Lonnie Clark Williams, Jr.1 appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
During the pendency of this appeal, appellant changed her name to Lonnie
Mo’Niqué Williams-Turner.
process, deliberate indifference, and conspiracy claims against several prison
officials. The district court sua sponte dismissed with prejudice Williams’s amended
complaint for failure to state a claim and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). We review de novo the district court’s determination
that the amended complaint failed to state any non-frivolous claim for relief, see
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011), and we review for abuse of
discretion the decision to dismiss without leave to amend, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). We affirm.
1. The district court did not err in its determination that Williams failed
to state a due process claim based on the application of the “R” suffix to her file.
The amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that, even
assuming application of the “R” suffix implicates a liberty interest, Williams was
deprived of adequate process. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir.
1997).
2. Nor was it error to dismiss Williams’s Eighth Amendment claims. In
connection with its preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1), the district court permissibly took judicial notice of multiple actions in
which Williams unsuccessfully pursued claims predicated on allegations that she
was being poisoned daily through her food and concluded that the poisoning claim
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alleged in the amended complaint in this action was duplicative and frivolous.2 See
Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). The district court also
appropriately dismissed Williams’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim based on threats by gang members given Williams’s transfer to a different
prison and the absence of allegations of actual injury at the former prison where the
threats allegedly occurred or any causal connection between the threats made and
harms incurred at her current prison. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
3. Because the district court permissibly concluded that Williams failed to
state an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court properly
dismissed Williams’s related conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Lacey
v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012). To the extent Williams’s
conspiracy claim relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the amended complaint also lacks
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim under that statute. See Gillespie v.
Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (listing elements).
4. Williams argues throughout her opening brief that she exhausted her
administrative remedies. However, the district court did not dismiss any portion of
the amended complaint based on a finding that Williams failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies. Therefore, we do not consider the issue.
2
Defendants’ motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 19) is granted.
3 18-55284
5. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
Williams’s amended complaint without leave to amend because further amendment
would have been futile. See Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988).
AFFIRMED.
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