Miguel Velasco-Marin v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 14 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MIGUEL ANGEL VELASCO-MARIN,                      No. 18-72279
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A200-147-933
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 9, 2020**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and SCHREIER,*** District
    Judge.
    Miguel Angel Velasco Marin petitions for review of a decision by the Board
    of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) holding that he is ineligible for cancellation of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
    District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
    removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b because he was convicted of an offense under
    § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) by violating a protection order. We deny the petition.
    1. The Protection Order: To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an
    applicant must establish that he “has not been convicted of an offense under
    section . . . 1227(a)(2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)
    refers to an alien “whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates
    the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of
    violence.” (Emphasis added.) A “protection order” is “any injunction issued for
    the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence. . . .” Id.
    Velasco Marin argues that, rather than considering his conduct in analyzing
    whether his offense was described in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), the BIA should have used
    the modified categorical approach. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
    569 U.S. 184
    , 200
    (2013) (stating that, when a provision refers to what “the noncitizen was ‘convicted
    of,’ not what he did, . . . the inquiry in immigration proceedings is limited
    accordingly”); see also Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 833
    , 836–37 (9th Cir.
    2008) (applying the modified categorical approach to a conviction for violating a
    protection order in the cancellation context). Velasco Marin argues that Matter of
    Obshatko, 
    27 I. & N. Dec. 173
     (BIA 2017), rejected the categorical approach only
    for the analysis of whether a violation of a protection order “renders an alien
    2
    removable,” and that the categorical approach still applies—as in Alanis-
    Alvarado—to the analysis of whether such a violation renders an alien ineligible
    for cancellation.
    Recent precedent forecloses this argument. In Matter of Medina-Jimenez, 
    27 I. & N. Dec. 399
     (BIA 2018), the BIA extended Obshatko to the cancellation
    context. The BIA reasoned that it would be “incongruous” to apply the categorical
    approach here because § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) concerns “a court’s determination
    regarding an alien’s conduct.” Id. at 403. In Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 
    931 F.3d 830
    ,
    838–43 (9th Cir. 2019), we deferred to the Obshatko/Medina-Jimenez test.
    Because Diaz-Quirazco deferred to the BIA’s interpretation that the categorical
    approach does not apply here, the BIA made no legal error in analyzing Velasco
    Marin’s conduct to determine whether his conviction for violating a protection
    order qualified as an offense described in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
    2. Due Process: Velasco Marin also argues that he was denied due process
    because the IJ gave the government extra time to brief arguments and did not allow
    his lawyer to present oral argument at one hearing. Due process rights are violated
    when a proceeding is “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from
    reasonably presenting his case.” Colmenar v. INS, 
    210 F.3d 967
    , 971 (9th Cir.
    2000) (internal quotation omitted).
    3
    The IJ did not act unfairly. She permitted the parties to present all the
    relevant facts and even asked for additional evidence. She allowed Velasco Marin
    numerous opportunities to submit briefs and present arguments.
    PETITION DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-72279

Filed Date: 12/14/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/14/2020