Angel Diaz-Mendoza v. William Barr ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 14 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANGEL ANTONIO DIAZ-MENDOZA,                     No.    20-70023
    AKA Chayo Mendoza,
    Agency No. A205-386-378
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 10, 2020**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: TALLMAN, MURGUIA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Angel Diaz-Mendoza, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
    from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we dismiss in part and
    deny in part the petition for review.
    1.     Petitioner missed the filing deadline by seventeen years when he
    raised his asylum claim in defense of removal. The BIA did not err in finding that
    Petitioner failed to show “extraordinary circumstances” to justify his failure to file
    for asylum within one year of his 2002 entry into the United States. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(B), (D). Petitioner’s testimony that his brother misinformed and
    dissuaded him from seeking asylum does not constitute an “extraordinary
    circumstance.” See Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 
    317 F.3d 1089
    , 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (“As a general rule, ignorance of the law is no excuse . . . .”) (citation omitted).
    Further, Petitioner’s argument that his application delay was attributable to
    possible mental incompetency was rejected as unpersuasive by the BIA and thus
    presents a disputed issue of fact which we do not have jurisdiction to review.
    Gasparyan v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1130
    , 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Where the underlying
    facts are disputed, . . . we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s extraordinary
    circumstances determination.”) (citations omitted). Petitioner’s changed country
    conditions argument was not raised before the BIA, is therefore unexhausted, and
    for that reason is not within the scope of our review. Arrey v. Barr, 
    916 F.3d 1149
    ,
    1157 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
    2
    2.     The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner
    was ineligible for withholding of removal because his prior felony assault
    conviction constituted a “particularly serious crime.” Our abuse of discretion
    review of a “particularly serious crime” determination “is limited to ensuring that
    the agency relied on the ‘appropriate factors’ and ‘[]proper evidence’ to reach this
    conclusion.” Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 
    800 F.3d 1072
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 2015)
    (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “The applicable legal standard to
    determine if a crime is particularly serious . . . requires the agency to ask whether
    ‘the nature of the conviction, the underlying facts and circumstances and the
    sentence imposed justify the presumption that the convicted immigrant is a danger
    to the community.’” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). Here, the BIA properly applied these
    factors to Petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner asks us to reconsider the facts of his
    conviction and reweigh the relevant factors, which we do not have jurisdiction to
    do. 
    Id.
     at 1077–78 (citation omitted).
    3.     Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioner did not
    meet his burden of showing more likely than not that he would be tortured if
    returned to El Salvador. “Under the substantial evidence standard, the court
    upholds the BIA’s determination unless the evidence in the record compels a
    contrary conclusion.” Arteaga v. Mukasey, 
    511 F.3d 940
    , 944 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (citation omitted). Petitioner’s argument that he last dressed as a woman in 2013
    3
    does not compel us to find that the BIA’s decision is incorrect. The BIA noted that
    the last alleged act of persecution occurred more than twenty years ago when
    Petitioner was nineteen years old and that he had safely relocated to another part of
    the country. Substantial evidence thus supports the BIA’s conclusion that
    Petitioner’s likelihood of facing future torture was too speculative to give rise to
    CAT relief and the danger had lessened with the passage of time.
    4.     We lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s competency argument
    because he did not exhaust this issue before the BIA. Sola v. Holder, 
    720 F.3d 1134
    , 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2013). Petitioner’s remaining arguments supporting the
    merits of his claims for relief from removal are not grounds on which the BIA
    relied in rendering its decision, so they are not within our scope of review. Arrey,
    916 F.3d at 1157.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part AND DENIED in part.
    Petitioner’s Motion for Stay of Removal (ECF No. 1) is DENIED AS MOOT.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-70023

Filed Date: 12/14/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/14/2020