Wilmington Trust, Na v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 206 Val ( 2020 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 15 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL No. 19-17573
ASSOCIATION, not in its individual
capacity but as Trustee of ARLP DC No. 2:17 cv-0460-JAD
Securitization Trust, Series 2014-2,
Plaintiff-Appellee, MEMORANDUM*
v.
SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 206
VALERIAN,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES,
INC.; CINNAMON RIDGE
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Submitted December 11, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: TASHIMA, TALLMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Saticoy Bay LLC Series 206 Valerian (“Saticoy”) appeals the judgment of
the district court declaring that Saticoy purchased certain real property subject to a
first deed of trust held by Wilmington Trust, National Association (“Wilmington”).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review a grant of partial
summary judgment de novo, Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017,
1021 (9th Cir. 2001), and we affirm.
1. The district court properly concluded that the homeowner’s April 30,
2013, payment satisfied the superpriority portion of Cinnamon Ridge Community
Association’s (“HOA”) lien. First, Sharon Taylor Bergeron, the HOA’s Rule
30(b)(6) designee, testified that the payment fully satisfied those assessments.
Second, Bergeron relied on a ledger that confirms that the homeowner’s payment
resulted in a $0 balance on his HOA account. Third, Saticoy did not produce any
contrary evidence. Because the homeowner’s payment fully satisfied the
superpriority portion of the lien, Saticoy took the property subject to the first deed
of trust. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113, 116 (Nev.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
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2018) (en banc) (as amended). Furthermore, because the HOA itself allocated the
homeowner’s payment to the delinquent assessments, the district court was not
required to allocate the payment pursuant to the standards set out in 9352
Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 459 P.3d 227, 231 (Nev. 2020).
2. Saticoy is not protected as a bona fide purchaser (“BFP”). Under
Nevada law, “[a] party’s status as a BFP is irrelevant when a defect in the
foreclosure proceeding renders the sale void,” and, “after a valid tender of the
superpriority portion of an HOA lien, a foreclosure sale on the entire lien is void as
to the superpriority portion, because it cannot extinguish the first deed of trust on
the property.” Bank of Am., N.A., 427 P.3d at 121. Thus, even assuming Saticoy is
a BFP, that status is irrelevant.
3. The district court did not err by granting Wilmington equitable relief.
The relief awarded by the district court here is consistent with that awarded by the
Nevada Supreme Court in comparable cases. See, e.g., id.
4. Because the district court properly granted relief on Wilmington’s
tender theory, we need not address whether Wilmington could also prevail on its
commercial unreasonableness theory.
5. Saticoy’s argument that Wilmington’s unjust enrichment claim is
barred by the voluntary payment doctrine fails because it is based on the flawed
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premise that the foreclosure sale extinguished Wilmington’s deed of trust. The
district court therefore did not err by declining to dismiss this claim.
AFFIRMED.
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