Alejandra Carranza-Aley v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 15 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALEJANDRA CARRANZA-ALEY,                        No.   18-73130
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A208-205-732
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 11, 2020**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: BOGGS,*** M. SMITH, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
    Alejandra Carranza-Aley seeks review of an order of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed the decision of an Immigration
    Judge (IJ) denying Carranza-Aley’s application for asylum and withholding of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the
    Convention Against Torture (CAT). This court has jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a). Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision and added its own reasoning,
    we review both decisions. Nuru v. Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 1207
    , 1215 (9th Cir. 2005).
    Carranza-Aley’s claims rested on abuse she suffered as a child at the hands of
    her father, the murder of her domestic partner by gangs in Mexico, and extortion of
    the business where she worked after her partner’s death.
    1. The IJ and BIA determined that Carranza-Aley had not established the
    requisite nexus between past or future persecution and her claimed particular social
    group of “female heads of households” or political opinion of “opposing gang
    extortion.” Because she does not “specifically and distinctly” contest this finding,
    her claim that persecution was, or will be, based on a protected basis is waived. See
    Husyev v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 1172
    , 1183 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kim v. Kang, 
    154 F.3d 996
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 1998)).
    2. Even if Carranza-Aley’s claim of persecution for belonging to a particular
    social group was not waived, there was no error below. There is no evidence that
    gangs extorted the business where Carranza-Aley worked on account of her political
    opinion or her status as a female head of household.1 Similarly, even if she has a
    1
    Because Carranza-Aley fails to establish a nexus to a protected ground, we do not
    decide whether her proposed particular social group or political opinion are
    cognizable as protected grounds under the INA.
    2
    well-founded fear of violence by gangs in the future, there is no evidence that it will
    be because of a protected basis. “An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by
    criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus
    to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Accordingly, Carranza-Aley has not demonstrated a nexus between the claimed
    persecution and a protected basis as required for asylum and withholding of removal
    under the INA. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 
    846 F.3d 351
    , 358–60 (9th Cir. 2017).
    3. The IJ and BIA also determined that Carranza-Aley failed to establish that
    it is more likely than not that she will be tortured with the consent or acquiescence
    of the government. They found, therefore, that she did not warrant protection under
    the CAT.      See 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18
    (a)(1), 1208.16(c)(2).           Claims based on
    “generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico,” are insufficient to prove
    that one is more likely than not to be tortured. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 
    600 F.3d 1148
    , 1152 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Wakkary v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 1049
    , 1067–68
    (9th Cir. 2009). Carranza-Aley has not presented evidence that she will be singled
    out for torture because of her initial assistance in a police investigation into the death
    of her domestic partner. Therefore, Carranza-Aley does not qualify for CAT
    protection.
    We DENY the petition for review and affirm the decision of the BIA.
    3