Matt Jacobsen v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs. LLC ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATT P. JACOBSEN, No. 19-16341
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00017-MMD-
WGC
v.
RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM*
SERVICES, LLC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 2, 2020**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Matt P. Jacobsen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims challenging foreclosure
proceedings on his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a district court’s dismissal based on res judicata, Stewart v. U.S.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), and we may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 992 (9th
Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s action as barred by res
judicata because Jacobsen’s claims were raised or could have been raised in his
prior federal actions between the parties or their privies that resulted in a final
judgment on the merits. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (“The
preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common
law.”); Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (federal claim preclusion “applies when there is
(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or
privity between the parties” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent that certain of Jacobsen’s claims could not have been raised in
the prior federal actions, dismissal of those claims was proper because Jacobsen
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s August 19, 2019 post-
judgment order denying Jacobsen’s motion for injunctive relief because Jacobsen
failed to file an amended or separate notice of appeal of that order. See Whitaker v.
2 19-16341
Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2007) (appellant generally must file a
separate notice of appeal or amend a previously filed notice of appeal to secure
review of a post-judgment order).
Jacobsen’s motion to accept the late filed reply brief (Docket Entry No. 28)
is granted. The Clerk will file the reply brief submitted on November 6, 2020.
Appellees’ motion to cancel the lis pendens (Docket Entry No. 29) is denied
without prejudice to renewing this motion before the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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