Judith Brown v. Newrez LLC ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUDITH V. BROWN, No. 19-17331
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-02889-DWL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NEWREZ LLC; BANK OF AMERICA,
NA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 2, 2020**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Judith V. Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of foreclosure
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Brown’s action because Brown failed
to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants made any misrepresentations to
Brown in connection with her request for a loan modification. See KB Home
Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 340 P.3d 405, 412 n.7 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2014) (elements of negligent misrepresentation claim); Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of
Tucson, Inc., 666 P.2d 83, 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (elements of Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act claim); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for
leave to amend her complaint because Brown’s proposed amended complaint
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for misrepresentation in
connection with Brown’s request for a loan modification, and therefore amendment
would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d
1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that leave
to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile).
AFFIRMED.
2 19-17331