Darwin Alvarez-Umanzor v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 16 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DARWIN EDIMAR ALVAREZ-                           No.   19-71667
    UMANZOR, DEYBIN EDIMAR
    ALVAREZ-SANTOS, MAIRA                            Agency Nos.         A206-793-461
    JACKELINE SANTOS-SANTOS,                                             A206-793-429
    ESCARLETH MICHELL ALVAREZ-                                           A206-793-430
    SANTOS,                                                              A206-793-462
    Petitioners,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 10, 2020**
    San Francisco, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: W. FLETCHER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and SCHREIER,*** District
    Judge.
    Darwin Edimar Alvarez-Umanzor, Maira Jackeline Santos-Santos, and their
    two minor children, Deybin Edimar Alvarez-Santos and Escarleth Michell
    Alvarez-Santos (Petitioners), are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They appeal
    the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the
    determination of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying their applications for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
    (CAT). This court has jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    .
    “We review denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for
    substantial evidence and will uphold a denial supported by reasonable, substantial,
    and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Yali Wang v.
    Sessions, 
    861 F.3d 1003
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ling Huang v. Holder, 
    744 F.3d 1149
    , 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted)).
    The IJ found, and the BIA affirmed, that Petitioners’ eligibility for asylum
    fails for two reasons: lack of particularity of the alleged social groups and lack of
    nexus between persecution and social group membership. A cognizable social
    group must be “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
    ***
    The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
    District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
    2
    characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the
    society in question.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 1070
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 2020)
    (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 
    26 I. & N. Dec. 227
    , 237 (B.I.A. 2014)). Petitioners
    must also demonstrate a nexus between social group membership and persecution.
    Reyes v. Lynch, 
    842 F.3d 1125
    , 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016).
    Here, Petitioners presented what they claimed to be two cognizable social
    groups to the Immigration Judge: (1) “imputed members or imputed former
    members of the M-18 gang in El Salvador” and (2) “Salvadoran landowners forced
    to cooperate with gangs for the benefit of the gang causing imputed gang
    membership.” Substantial evidence in the record shows that these social groups
    lack the particularity to be a discrete group of people that can be neatly described
    or identified. See Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 
    714 F.3d 1161
    , 1165 (9th Cir. 2013).
    The notion of imputed gang membership is “amorphous and overbroad,” especially
    in the context of widespread gang violence throughout El Salvador. Substantial
    evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that “landowners forced to cooperate
    with gangs” was “too diverse” to qualify as a particular social group. And the BIA
    did not err in finding that there is no nexus between the persecution suffered by the
    petitioners and membership in these groups because Salvadoran citizens not in
    these groups were victimized in similar ways. Thus, the BIA’s determination that
    3
    Petitioners are not members of a cognizable social group is supported by
    substantial evidence.
    Petitioners contend that the BIA erred when it failed to address membership
    in a social group based upon Santos-Santos’s gender. But the record indicates that
    Petitioners never presented this alleged gender-based social group to the IJ. Thus,
    the BIA correctly declined to address this issue.
    The doctrines of waiver and forfeiture apply in the context of removal
    proceedings. Honcharov v. Barr, 
    924 F.3d 1293
    , 1296 (9th Cir. 2019). The BIA is
    “an appellate body whose function is to review, not create a record[.]” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    In re Fedorenko, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 57
    , 74 (B.I.A. 1984)). Petitioners failed to argue
    to the IJ that gender was a cognizable particular social group, and they failed to
    argue that there was a nexus between the persecution and Santos-Santos’ gender.
    The BIA did not err when it declined to consider this newly alleged group on
    appeal.
    PETITION DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-71667

Filed Date: 12/16/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/16/2020