Vincent Chavez v. Sullivan ( 2020 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 17 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VINCENT GINO CHAVEZ, No. 19-15543
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00952-JKS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SULLIVAN, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
James K. Singleton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, IKUTA, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
California prisoner Vincent Chavez petitions for review of the district court's
denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to § 2253(a) and affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Chavez was convicted of first degree murder for the fatal stabbing of Sue
Saeturn. The jury also found true special allegations that Chavez used a deadly
weapon, and that the murder was gang-related. On appeal, the California Court of
Appeal reversed the gang-related special circumstance and enhancement, but
otherwise found no reversible error. Chavez subsequently filed a habeas petition
pursuant to § 2254 in district court. The district court denied his petition but
certified his cumulative error claim for appeal.
First, Chavez argues that the Superior Court’s decision not to instruct the
jury as to the “heat of the passion” lesser-included offense violated state law and
his right to present a defense. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.
2000). The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court's decision not to
give the jury instruction was proper under state law because there was no evidence
of provocation, a required element of the offense. That determination is binding on
this court. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). The jury instruction
was not required under federal law because, without any evidence to satisfy the
provocation element, a reasonable jury could not have found in Chavez’s favor.
See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
Second, Chavez contends that the testimony of one of the prosecution's gang
experts violated People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 665 (2016). In Sanchez, the
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California Supreme Court held that expert witnesses’ use of case-specific
testimonial hearsay runs afoul of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th at 684. Chavez does not, however, cite any U.S. Supreme
Court decision applying Crawford in the same manner as Sanchez.
Third, Chavez claims that because the prosecutor and expert witness referred
to him by name in hypothetical questions, the expert improperly opined on his
guilt, thereby depriving him of due process and violating People v. Vang, 52 Cal.
4th 1038 (2011). But in his brief, Chavez agreed with the district court that expert
testimony “on the ultimate issue is not contrary to or an unreasonable application
of Supreme Court precedent.”
Because the state appellate court could reasonably conclude that the only
two potential trial court errors—the heat of passion instruction and the gang
expert’s testimony—did not together render the trial fundamentally unfair, the state
appellate court’s rejection of Chavez’s cumulative error claim was not an
unreasonable application of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) for
purposes of Section 2254(d)(1).
We note that Chavez raises a number of additional arguments in his briefs,
some of which are framed as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability.
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These claims were not presented to the district court and are not cognizable on
appeal. See King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992).
AFFIRMED.
4