United States v. America Aguilar-Reyes ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 21 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    19-50074
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00540-PA-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    AMERICA AGUILAR-REYES, AKA
    America Aguilar, AKA America Reyes
    Aguilar, AKA America Aguilar Ferrino,
    AKA Marisol Flores, AKA Sandra Lopez,
    AKA Areyery Reyes,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 7, 2020
    San Francisco, California
    Before: BOGGS,** M. SMITH, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
    America Aguilar-Reyes challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to
    dismiss the indictment charging her with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    § 1326, for which she was later convicted. We affirm. Because the parties are
    familiar with the facts of the case, we do not repeat them here except where required
    to give context to our ruling.
    A person is guilty of the offense of illegal reentry if she “has been denied
    admission, excluded, deported, or removed [from] the United States . . . and
    thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a). Aguilar-Reyes challenges three prior deportation orders—entered
    in 2001, 2005, and 2012—that underlie her conviction. Because we hold that the
    2012 removal order was valid, we do not reach Aguilar-Reyes’s challenges to the
    2001 and 2005 removal orders.
    The 2012 removal order was entered pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1225
    (b)(1)(A)(i),
    which permits expedited removal of any person “[i]f an immigration officer
    determines that an alien . . . who is arriving in the United States . . . is inadmissible
    under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title.” If the conditions are met,
    “the officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further
    hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum
    under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1225
    (b)(1)(A)(i).
    Section 1182(a)(6)(C) applies to “[a]ny alien who, by fraud or willfully
    misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure . . . admission into the United
    States.” Finally, § 1182(a)(7) applies to “any immigrant at the time of application
    2
    for admission who is not in possession of a valid unexpired . . . entry document[.]”
    Aguilar-Reyes’s 2012 determination of inadmissibility was based on both
    fraud and the possession of invalid entry documents. It is undisputed that, in 2012,
    Aguilar-Reyes attempted to enter the United States by presenting an LPR card that
    did not belong to her.
    Furthermore, Aguilar-Reyes’s assertions that her 2012 expedited removal
    independently violated her due process rights are unavailing. As an initial matter,
    Aguilar-Reyes did not raise this until her opening brief. The appellate court will not
    review an issue for the first time on appeal absent narrow exceptions including—as
    relevant here—a showing of plain error affecting substantial rights. United States v.
    Flores-Payon, 
    942 F.2d 556
    , 558 (9th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
    Furthermore, Aguilar-Reyes did not present any evidence or allegations to the
    district court that would support dismissal based on infirmities in the 2012 expedited
    removal. It was therefore not plainly erroneous for the district court to deny the
    motion to dismiss. See United States v. Leon-Leon, 
    35 F.3d 1428
    , 1431 (9th Cir.
    1994). Because the 2012 removal was independent of the 2001 and 2005 removals,
    and the 2012 removal was a sufficient predicate for the offense of illegal reentry, the
    district court did not err by denying Aguilar-Reyes’s motion to dismiss the
    indictment.
    Based on our disposition, the Government’s pending motion to take judicial
    3
    notice is denied as moot.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-50074

Filed Date: 12/21/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2020