Constantino Basile v. the Los Angeles Film Sch., LLC ( 2020 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 10 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CONSTANTINO BASILE, No. 19-56293
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:18-cv-08604-CJC-ADS
v.
THE LOS ANGELES FILM SCHOOL, MEMORANDUM*
LLC, DBA The Los Angeles Film School; AND ORDER
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
U.S. DISTRICT COURT-CENTRAL
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN
DIVISION; et al.,
Defendants,
v.
CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS, a public
entity, erroneously sued and served herein
as Beverly Hills Police Department,
Movant-Appellee.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 8, 2020**
Before: GRABER, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Constantine Basile appeals pro se the district court’s orders
dismissing his action with prejudice and declaring him a vexatious litigant.
Plaintiff alleges that the Los Angeles Film School stole his class projects, sold his
ideas to major television and film studios, and conspired with other defendants to
intimidate him and keep him from enforcing his intellectual property rights. The
present case is Plaintiff’s sixth suit in six years based on the same theory. This
time, he alleges claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"), civil rights statutes, and the Copyright Act, and brings claims for
contributory copyright infringement, defamation, recklessness, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy against more than 30 defendants.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff must allege facts showing
that the "right to relief [rises] above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). We must accept material factual allegations
as true, but pleadings that contain "no more than conclusions are not entitled to the
assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see also Pareto
v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) ("conclusory allegations . . . and
unwarranted inferences" are insufficient). We may "affirm a 12(b)(6) dismissal on
any ground supported by the record, even if the district court did not rely on the
ground." United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). De novo review also applies to rulings on
claim and issue preclusion. Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th
Cir. 1992).
The district court properly ruled that all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by a
combination of claim preclusion, nonmutual issue preclusion, basic pleading
principles, litigation privileges, and frivolousness. Plaintiff’s claims against the 12
repeat defendants stem from the same transaction as did his five prior suits, and his
factual allegations are the same. All prior cases resulted in final judgments on the
merits. Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 921 (9th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants named for the first time in this case rely on
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issues actually litigated and necessarily decided previously. Granite Rock Co. v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 287, 649 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011); State of
Idaho Potato Comm'n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 714 n.3
(9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff fails to state any plausible claim for RICO violations,
civil rights violations, defamation, or conspiracy, as he either omits required
elements or rests each of those claims on unreasonable inferences or conclusory
legal allegations.
We also reject Plaintiff’s other arguments. Assignment of the case to a
magistrate judge was proper, and the district court properly conducted its own de
novo review of the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(3). A court may dismiss an action sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) when it
is clear that the plaintiff has not stated a claim on which relief can be granted. See
Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) ("A trial court
may dismiss a claim sua sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6) . . . without notice where the
claimant cannot possibly win relief." (citations omitted)). Plaintiff’s contentions
that the arbitrator and the magistrate judge threatened and libeled him are
unsupported by the record.
Finally, we review prefiling orders against vexatious litigants for abuse of
discretion. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056–57 (9th Cir.
4
2007) (per curiam). We recognize that "pre-filing orders should rarely be filed,
and only if courts comply with certain procedural and substantive requirements."
Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But this is the rare case in which such an order
is warranted. As required, the district court gave Plaintiff notice and opportunity to
oppose the order, compiled an adequate record, made substantive findings of
frivolousness and harassment, and tailored the order narrowly. Id.Plaintiff’s corrected motion to transmit physical exhibits, filed on December
17, 2019, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record, filed on
December 23, 2019, is DENIED.
AFFIRMED.
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