Michael Wyatt v. John Sutton ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 24 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL EUGENE WYATT, No. 20-15203
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:18-cv-06588-PJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JOHN SUTTON,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, IKUTA, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Michael Wyatt appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
2253, and we review the district court’s decision de novo. Boyer v. Belleque, 659
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by
Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.1
Wyatt’s contention that the state court unreasonably applied Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979), or reached an unreasonable determination of the
facts, cannot overcome the double deference we afford to insufficient evidence
claims on habeas review of state court convictions under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat.
1214. See Johnson v. Montgomery, 899 F.3d 1052, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In
addition to Jackson’s already deferential standard …. we must conclude that the
state court’s determination that a rational jury could have found each required
element proven beyond a reasonable doubt was not just wrong but was objectively
unreasonable.”); Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012) (“[T]he only
question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below
the threshold of bare rationality.”). If the record supports conflicting inferences, we
“must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier
of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that
resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.
On habeas review of Jackson claims, “we … look to state law only to establish
the elements of the crime and then turn to the federal question of whether the state
court was objectively unreasonable in concluding that sufficient evidence supported
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Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recite them here only as necessary.
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its decision.” Johnson, 899 F.3d at 1056 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). In
California, a defendant commits first-degree murder if the killing was willful,
premeditated, and deliberate. See Cal. Penal Code § 189; People v. Sandoval, 363
P.3d 41, 64 (Cal. 2015). Specifically, “‘[d]eliberation’ refers to careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in
advance.” Sandoval, 363 P.3d at 64 (quoting People v. Koontz, 46 P.3d 335, 361
(Cal. 2002)). California courts generally look to three non-exhaustive factors as
guidelines in determining premeditation and deliberation: planning, motive, and
manner of killing. Sandoval, 363 P.3d at 65.
Here, the state court reasonably determined that Wyatt’s first-degree murder
conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. With respect to preexisting motive,
it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Wyatt’s increasingly violent
attempts to quiet his unarmed, mentally handicapped roommate James Nobles
evinced a motive to accomplish what Wyatt had previously and repeatedly asked
for: peace and quiet free from Nobles’s “nagging.” See People v. Boatman, 221 Cal.
App. 4th 1253, 1268 (2013). With respect to the manner of killing, a jury could have
reasonably determined that Wyatt considered his previous unsuccessful attempts at
quieting Nobles and, instead of continuing to punch Nobles or throw objects at him,
deliberately resorted to killing him by stabbing him in the chest to silence him.
Wyatt’s decision to grab, and then plunge, a knife into Nobles’s chest, multiple
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times, could also reasonably reveal “a method sufficiently ‘particular and exacting’
to warrant an inference that [Wyatt] was acting according to a preconceived design”
of quieting his roommate once and for all. People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 115
(Cal. 1992); see also People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1968) (surveying
state law and noting that “directly plunging a lethal weapon into the chest evidences
a deliberate intention to kill”). The jury could also have reasonably concluded that
Wyatt’s additional actions—not immediately seeking aid after he stabbed Nobles,
waiting twelve hours with Nobles’s corpse before dumping the body at a time least
likely to be seen, and lying to others (including the police)—all further evince that
Wyatt’s conduct was not merely the product of rash impulse. Cf. Boatman, 221 Cal.
App. 4th at 1269 (“Defendant’s actions immediately afterward—directing Brenton
to call 911 and attempting to resuscitate Marth and seek medical aid—are not the
actions of an executioner.”). Likewise, it would be reasonable for the jury to infer
that Wyatt’s previous murder of a friend after an altercation also supported the
conclusion that he carefully weighed the considerations of stabbing Nobles in
advance of doing so. See People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 234 (Cal. 2002) (“[T]he
more often one kills, especially under similar circumstances, the more reasonable
the inference the killing was intended and premeditated.”).
While Wyatt contends that “[a]ll that was proven here was a ‘mere
unconsidered or rash impulse’ that led to a spontaneous and frenzied lashing out with
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a knife,” the controlling question under AEDPA’s double deference standard is
whether the state court’s different conclusion was objectively unreasonable.
Johnson, 899 F.3d at 1056–57. As discussed above, it was not. And Wyatt’s
argument that state law precludes the jury’s inferences and conclusions fails because
“the minimum amount of evidence … require[d] to prove the offense is purely a
matter of federal law,” not state law. Coleman, 566 U.S. at 655.
The state court’s decision was a reasonable application of the law and based
on a reasonable determination of the facts, and therefore the district court properly
denied Wyatt’s federal habeas petition. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 751 (9th
Cir. 2009); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
AFFIRMED.
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