Local Jt. Exec Bd of Las Vegas v. NLRB ( 2020 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 30 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD OF                  No.    19-73322
    LAS VEGAS,
    NLRB No. 28-CA-213783
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
    BOARD,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    National Labor Relations Board
    Argued and Submitted December 10, 2020
    Pasadena, California
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY,**
    District Judge.
    Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas (“the Union”) petitions for review
    of a final decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or
    “the Board”). As the facts are known to the parties, we do not repeat them here
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States District Judge for
    the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    except as necessary to explain our decision.
    I
    The Union challenges the Board’s decision to depart from its only-recently-
    adopted policy requiring employers in “right-to-work” jurisdictions to continue
    collecting voluntary union dues from employees, and remitting those dues to the
    union, beyond the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement giving rise to
    such an arrangement, which is typically known as “dues checkoff.” Although we
    have previously recognized that the Board is free to modify its approach to dues
    checkoff, see Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB (“LJEB III”), 
    657 F.3d 865
    , 876 (9th Cir. 2011), to withstand scrutiny, the Board’s explication of its
    decision may not be inadequate, irrational, or arbitrary. See Local Joint Exec. Bd.
    of Las Vegas v. NLRB (“LJEB I”), 
    309 F.3d 578
    , 583 (9th Cir. 2002). The Board
    remains subject to the scheme of reasoned decisionmaking established by the
    Administrative Procedure Act. See id.; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S.,
    Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 52 (1983) (agency action must
    be the “product of reasoned decisionmaking”). “Under this standard, ‘not only
    must an agency’s decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the
    process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.’” LJEB 
    I, 309 F.3d at 583
    (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    522 U.S. 359
    ,
    374 (1998)).
    2
    For an agency’s decisionmaking to be rational, the agency must recognize
    and explain any departures from precedent. “[A]n agency may not depart from a
    prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.”
    Altera Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
    926 F.3d 1061
    , 1085
    (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
    556 U.S. 502
    , 515
    (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Modesto Irrigation Dist. v.
    Gutierrez, 
    619 F.3d 1024
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Courts will not assume an agency
    has engaged in reasoned decision making when it implicitly departs from its prior
    precedent and provides no explanation for doing so.” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    In the decision under review, the Board explained that the doctrine
    articulated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz, 
    369 U.S. 736
    , 743 (1962)
    prohibits employers from making unilateral changes to terms and conditions of
    employment during the collective bargaining process. Under Katz, terms
    pertaining to mandatory bargaining subjects that are contained in a collective
    bargaining agreement are typically continued in effect by operation of law beyond
    the contract’s expiration, until the parties have reached a formal impasse in
    negotiations toward a new agreement. This doctrine is grounded in an
    interpretation of § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which
    codifies an employer’s obligation to bargain in good faith with the representative
    3
    selected by its employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
    The Board concluded in this case, however, that dues checkoff is a term of
    employment that is “uniquely of a contractual nature” and therefore enforceable
    “only for the duration of the contractual obligation created by the parties.” The
    Board distinguished such terms of employment that are “rooted in the contract”
    and “cannot exist in a bargaining relationship until the parties affirmatively
    contract to be so bound” from aspects of employment that appear in a collective
    bargaining agreement, but that may exist from the commencement of the
    bargaining relationship and prior to the contract’s formation—such as “provisions
    relating to wages, pension, and welfare benefits, hours, working conditions, and
    numerous other mandatory bargaining subjects.” The Board reasoned that dues
    checkoff belongs in the former category, and is therefore exempt from Katz’s
    prohibition on post-contract unilateral changes, such that an employer does not
    commit an unfair labor practice by suspending dues checkoff after the collective
    bargaining agreement imposing that obligation has expired.
    The Board’s dues checkoff rule, although reflecting a change in policy, is
    not new, and previous iterations of the rule have been litigated before this court.
    Nevertheless, the Board’s “contract creation” rationale for the rule had never been
    explicitly adopted by a Board majority until this case.
    The Union has identified several Board precedents that appear to conflict
    4
    with the “contract creation” rationale that the Board employed here. In multiple
    prior cases, the Board has determined that the Katz doctrine applies to terms and
    conditions of employment that are contained in a collective bargaining agreement
    and that indisputably could not have existed until they were “created” by such an
    agreement.
    In particular, the Board has concluded in prior decisions that, under Katz,
    each of the following obligations contained in a collective bargaining agreement
    survived the expiration of that agreement: requiring an employer to process
    grievances short of arbitration, Am. Gypsum Co., 
    285 N.L.R.B. 100
    , 100 (1987);
    Bethlehem Steel Co., 
    136 N.L.R.B. 1500
    , 1503 (1962); granting union
    representatives leave or time off for official union business, Am. 
    Gypsum, 285 N.L.R.B. at 102
    ; requiring an employer to hire workers through a union hiring hall,
    Sage Dev. Co., 
    301 N.L.R.B. 1173
    , 1179 (1991); permitting union access to the
    employer’s property, Frontier Hotel & Casino, 
    309 N.L.R.B. 761
    , 766 (1992);
    recognizing stewards designated by a union at the employer’s workplace,
    Frankline, Inc., 
    287 N.L.R.B. 263
    , 263–64 (1987); granting seniority rights to
    union officials
    , id. at 264;
    Bethlehem 
    Steel, 136 N.L.R.B. at 1503
    ; contributing to
    collectively bargained multiemployer trust funds, such as health and welfare funds,
    pension funds, vacation funds, and apprenticeship funds, PRC Recording Co., 
    280 N.L.R.B. 615
    , 618 (1986); KBMS, Inc., 
    278 N.L.R.B. 826
    , 849 (1986); Vin James
    5
    Plastering Co., 
    226 N.L.R.B. 125
    , 132 (1976); and, abiding by seniority provisions
    when recalling workers from layoffs, Am. Gypsum 
    Co., 285 N.L.R.B. at 102
    & n.6,
    PRC Recording, 280 N.L.R.B at 636.
    The Board was required to grapple explicitly with these apparently contrary
    precedents in its decision, but it failed do so. See 
    Altera, 926 F.3d at 1085
    ;
    
    Modesto, 619 F.3d at 1034
    . For the Board’s decision to be a reasoned one, the
    Board must recognize and explain any departure from precedent. It may not
    simply ignore inconvenient precedents or dispense with them “sub silentio.”
    
    Altera, 926 F.3d at 1085
    . The Board must explicitly address the prior decisions
    identified by the Union and provide a coherent account of the relationship between
    such precedents and the “contract creation” rationale employed in this case.
    Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Board so that it may address this gap in
    its decisionmaking process.
    II
    Although the reasoning underlying the Board’s rule in this case was
    inadequate, and must be addressed by the Board upon remand, it does not
    necessarily follow that the Board’s rule must be vacated. See Cal. Cmtys. Against
    Toxics v. EPA, 
    688 F.3d 989
    , 992 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A flawed rule need not be
    vacated.”). In deciding whether to remand without vacatur, we consider (1) the
    seriousness of the errors in the agency’s decision and (2) the disruptive
    6
    consequences of vacatur. See
    id. Here, the Board
    will likely be able to cure the identified flaw in its
    decisionmaking process. The Board will need to grapple explicitly with the
    contrary precedents that have been cited, to be sure, but the Board has discretion to
    adopt its preferred rule regarding dues checkoff as long as it provides an
    explanation for its apparent departure from those precedents. See LJEB 
    III, 657 F.3d at 876
    (“[T]he Board may adopt a different rule [regarding dues checkoff] in
    the future provided, of course, that such a rule is rational and consistent with the
    NLRA”).
    Moreover, another judicial intervention in the Board’s policymaking process
    with respect to dues check off in “right to work” jurisdictions may be needlessly
    disruptive. We vacated a previous version of this rule three times, and, since then,
    the Board has already changed its approach to the issue twice, based on legitimate
    shifts in regulatory perspective. The Board may change direction yet again. For us
    to insist here upon an “interim change that may itself be changed,” see Cal. 
    Cmtys., 688 F.3d at 992
    (internal quotation marks omitted), would, under these specific
    circumstances, gratuitously undermine the stability of collective bargaining
    relationships, which the Board has repeatedly identified as an important interest in
    its policymaking.
    Accordingly, we remand to the Board so that it may have an opportunity to
    7
    provide an adequate explanation for its approach to dues checkoff by explicitly
    addressing the precedents cited by the Union that appear to contradict the
    “contract-creation” rationale used in this case. We do not vacate the Board’s dues
    checkoff rule. The rule articulated by the Board may stand while it undertakes the
    process of supplementing its reasoning. This panel retains jurisdiction over any
    subsequent petition for relief.
    PETITION GRANTED, and REMANDED.
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