Deborah Barefield v. HSBC Holdings, Plc ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JAN 28 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DEBORAH BAREFIELD, as administrator             No. 19-16324
    of the Estate of Thomas W. Hatch,
    D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00527-LJO-JLT
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    HSBC HOLDINGS, PLC; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 20, 2021**
    Before:      McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
    Deborah Barefield appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing
    her action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of foreclosure
    proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo
    the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and a dismissal under Federal Rule of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Naffe v. Frey, 
    789 F.3d 1030
    ,
    1035 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
    The district court properly denied Barefield’s May 15, 2018 motion to
    remand the action to state court because the district court had subject matter
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     and 1332, and the action was properly
    removed under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1441
    . See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 
    522 U.S. 470
    ,
    475 (1998) (to establish jurisdiction under § 1331, a federal question must be
    “presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 
    519 U.S. 61
    , 68
    (1996) (requirements for diversity jurisdiction under § 1332).
    The district court properly denied Barefield’s October 24, 2018 motion to
    remand the action to state court because the district court continued to have
    diversity jurisdiction. See Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 
    179 F.3d 754
    , 757
    (9th Cir. 1999) (“[D]iversity jurisdiction is determined at the time the action
    commences, and a federal court is not divested of jurisdiction if . . . the amount in
    controversy subsequently drops below the minimum jurisdictional level.” (citation
    omitted)).
    The district court properly dismissed Barefield’s claims against Caliber
    Home Loans, Inc. and Summit Management Company, LLC (erroneously sued as
    Summit Property Management, Inc.) (“Caliber Defendants”) as well as HSBC
    2                                       19-16324
    Mortgage Services Inc. (erroneously sued as HSBC Holdings, PLC) because
    Barefield failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v.
    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain
    sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
    on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 9(b) (claims for fraud must be pleaded with particularity); 
    Cal. Civ. Code § 882.020
    (a)(1) (security instrument is enforceable until 10 years after the final
    maturity date “[i]f the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment of the
    debt or performance of the obligations in ascertainable from the recorded evidence
    of indebtedness”); Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 761.020 (elements of claim for adverse
    claim to title); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 
    8 P.3d 1089
    , 1110 (Cal. 2000)
    (explaining the nature of a breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    claim); Lazar v. Superior Court, 
    909 P.2d 981
    , 984 (Cal. 1996) (elements of fraud
    under California law); Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 
    134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622
    , 640-42 (Ct.
    App. 2011) (explaining the tender requirement and excuses to tender).
    The district court properly dismissed Barefield’s laches claim because laches
    is an affirmative defense and not a claim. See Golden Gate Water Ski Club v.
    County of Contra Costa, 
    80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876
    , 890 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Laches is an
    equitable defense based on the principle that those who neglect their rights may be
    barred from obtaining relief in equity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    3                                      19-16324
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Barefield’s motion
    to strike the Caliber Defendants’ answer because the delay was brief and had no
    impact on the proceedings, and there was no evidence of bad faith. See Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A); McCabe v. Arave, 
    827 F.2d 634
    , 639-40 (9th Cir. 1987) (the
    district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for
    sanctions for failing to file a timely answer because failure to file was due to
    inadvertence).
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                       19-16324