Greenlining Institute v. FCC ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 23 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GREENLINING INSTITUTE; et al.,                  No.    17-73283
    Petitioners,                    FCC No. 17-154
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
    COMMISSION; UNITED STATES OF
    AMERICA,
    Respondents,
    ______________________________
    USTELECOM-THE BROADBAND
    ASSOCIATION,
    Intervenor.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Federal Communications Commission
    Argued and Submitted August 27, 2019
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and GAITAN,** District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge
    for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    The Greenlining Institute, Public Knowledge, The Utility Reform Network,
    and the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates (collectively,
    “Petitioners”) seek review of a November 2017 order and declaratory ruling issued
    by the Federal Communications Commission. The parties are familiar with the
    facts, so we do not repeat them here. We have jurisdiction under 
    47 U.S.C. § 402
    and 
    28 U.S.C. § 2342
    (1), and deny the petition because Petitioners lack standing.
    At least one petitioner must have Article III standing for each of the
    challenges raised on appeal. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 
    137 S. Ct. 1645
    , 1650–51 (2017). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden
    of establishing standing,” which “must be supported in the same way as any other
    matter on which [that party] bears the burden of proof.” Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.
    Bonneville Power Admin., 
    117 F.3d 1520
    , 1528 (9th Cir. 1997).
    “[A]n organization may establish ‘injury in fact if it can demonstrate: (1)
    frustration of its organizational mission; and (2) diversion of its resources to
    combat the particular conduct in question.’” Am. Diabetes Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the
    Army, 
    938 F.3d 1147
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev.
    Corp., 
    358 F.3d 1097
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 2004)). Petitioners offer no estimate of the
    resources that will be diverted as a result of the order, let alone “uncontradicted
    evidence” that the proposed actions “required, and will continue to require, a
    diversion of resources, independent of expenses for this litigation, from their other
    2
    initiatives.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 
    932 F.3d 742
    , 766 (9th Cir.
    2018). Petitioners accordingly lack independent standing.
    Petitioners have similarly failed to establish associational standing, which
    requires that one of their “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
    own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and
    neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
    individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
    Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
    528 U.S. 167
    , 181 (2000). Although Petitioners’ purpose is
    germane to the interests at stake in this appeal, which does not require the
    participation of individual members, no member has demonstrated that “he or she
    ‘is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the
    challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury is both real and
    immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist.,
    
    306 F.3d 646
    , 656 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 
    461 U.S. 95
    , 102
    (1983)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened injury
    must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of
    possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
    , 409 (2013) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Here, Petitioners
    demonstrate no such certain, impending harm.
    PETITION DENIED.
    3