Gerald Sakamoto v. County of Los Angeles ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 23 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GERALD SAKAMOTO, by and through No. 18-55440
surviving heirs; et al.,
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-03181-R-AS
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 8, 2020
Pasadena, California
Before: WATFORD and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District
Judge.
1. Jane Sakamoto and her children, Mindy and Jason Sakamoto, appeal
from the district court’s dismissal of their wrongful death cause of action under
California state law against the County of Los Angeles and the State of California.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Page 2 of 5
The Sakamotos argue that California’s Government Claims Act does not bar their
suit, as they provided the County and State sufficient notice of their cause of action
before filing their complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
reverse the district court’s dismissal of Jane’s wrongful death cause of action but
affirm the dismissal of Mindy’s and Jason’s wrongful death cause of action.
Under the Government Claims Act, a plaintiff seeking damages from a
public entity must file a claim with the entity before bringing certain types of suits,
including wrongful death and survival causes of action. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4;
Castaneda v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 648, 655–56 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013). The claim must present each cause of action and provide the entity
with enough information to investigate and settle the claim if possible. Stockett v.
Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 99 P.3d 500, 502–03 (Cal.
2004). Here, the district court determined that the Sakamotos’ claim notified the
County and State only of their intent to pursue a survival action on behalf of the
estate of Gerald Sakamoto (Jane’s husband and Mindy and Jason’s father).
After reviewing the language of the claim, we conclude that the County and
State had sufficient notice of Jane’s wrongful death cause of action. The claim
explicitly mentioned loss of consortium damages, which in this context could be
requested only by a surviving spouse in a wrongful death suit. See Peterson v.
John Crane, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). The claim also
Page 3 of 5
identified the County’s and State’s roles in Gerald’s death, detailing the relevant
facts and circumstances. Accordingly, this is not a situation in which “there [was]
nothing in [the] claim to suggest it was filed in anything other than” Jane’s
representative capacity. See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 650,
661–62 & n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff could not pursue a
survival cause of action because her claim “did not identify any damages
recoverable by the estate”). Instead, the claim provided the County and State with
adequate information to investigate Jane’s wrongful death cause of action.
The claim did not, however, notify the County and State of Mindy’s and
Jason’s wrongful death cause of action. Children cannot receive loss of
consortium damages under California law, Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d
858, 865 (Cal. 1977), and the claim contained no indication that Mindy and Jason
were seeking damages in their individual capacities, see Nelson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at661–62.
2. The Sakamotos also appeal from the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the County on their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We
affirm.
Relying on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Sakamotos argue that the County violated the Fourteenth
Amendment for two reasons. First, they allege that the County had a constitutional
Page 4 of 5
duty to protect Gerald under DeShaney’s “special relationship” exception. See id.at 201–02. But this exception applies only when a county fails to protect someone
in its custody, Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2011), and
Gerald was not in the County’s custody at the time of his death.
Second, the Sakamotos contend that the County exhibited deliberate
indifference to “a known or obvious danger” by releasing Gerald from the jail in a
vulnerable medical state. See id. at 974 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even
after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Sakamotos, we find no
evidence in the record to support this claim. The nurses who evaluated Gerald had
no reason to suspect that he was unable to care for himself, nor did any other
County employee who interacted with him during his time at the jail. The record
also does not support a finding that Melvalisa Rodell—the operator who Jane
allegedly informed about Gerald’s medical needs—exhibited deliberate
indifference to his health or safety. To the contrary, Rodell testified that by the
time of Gerald’s incarceration she had memorized the phone number for the
Medical Command Center and that, had Jane told her about Gerald’s mental health
issues, she would have given Jane the number.
Even if a jury found that Rodell failed to give Jane this number, there is no
evidence to suggest that Rodell did so deliberately. See id. (explaining that an
individual acts with deliberate indifference when she “actually intend[s] to expose
Page 5 of 5
the plaintiff to [known] risks”). As a result, the district court properly dismissed
the Sakamotos’ claims against the individual County officials.
Because the Sakamotos cannot show that a County official committed an
underlying constitutional violation, the County itself cannot be held liable under
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Gibson v. County of
Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir. 2002).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.