High Country Paving, Inc. v. Usdc-Mmi ( 2020 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 2 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: HIGH COUNTRY PAVING, INC.,               No.    19-72853
    ______________________________
    D.C. No. 9:18-cv-00163-DWM
    HIGH COUNTRY PAVING, INC.,
    Petitioner,                     MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA,
    MISSOULA,
    Respondent,
    UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY
    COMPANY,
    Real Party in Interest.
    Petition for Writ of Mandamus
    Submitted March 31, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    High Country Paving petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the district
    court to vacate an order finding a waiver of work product protection and attorney-
    client privilege by High Country, and ordering production of nine responsive
    documents. The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not repeat them here.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1651(a), and we deny the petition.
    High Country “bears the burden of establishing that [its] ‘right to issuance of
    the writ is clear and indisputable.’” In re Bozic, 
    888 F.3d 1048
    , 1052 (9th Cir.
    2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
    542 U.S. 367
    , 381 (2004)). A writ of mandamus is governed by five factors. Bauman
    v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
    557 F.2d 650
    , 654–55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Perry v.
    Schwarzenegger, 
    591 F.3d 1147
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2010). While “[n]ot every factor
    need be present at once . . . the absence of the third factor, clear error, is
    dispositive.” 
    Perry, 591 F.3d at 1156
    (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
    v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
    408 F.3d 1142
    , 1146 (9th Cir. 2005)). High Country has failed
    to carry its heavy burden to show that the district court’s order is clearly
    erroneous. See In re Swift Trans. Co. Inc., 
    830 F.3d 913
    , 916–17 (9th Cir. 2016)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“It is well established that the
    absence of controlling precedent weighs strongly against a finding of clear
    error. If no prior Ninth Circuit authority prohibited the course taken by the district
    court, its ruling is not clearly erroneous.”). Nor has High Country met factors two,
    2
    four, or five. Only factor one weighs in High Country’s favor.
    PETITION DENIED.
    3