Bark v. Usfs ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 3 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BARK; et al.,                                   No.    19-35665
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No. 3:18-cv-01645-MO
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, a
    federal agency,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    HIGH CASCADE, INC.,
    Intervenor-Defendant-
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 10, 2019
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GRABER, BERZON, and HIGGINSON,** Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court
    of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Appellants Bark, Cascadia Wildlands, and Oregon Wild timely appeal the
    district court’s summary judgment in favor of Appellees, the United States Forest
    Service (USFS) and High Cascade, for claimed violations of the National
    Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Forest Management Act
    (NFMA). Reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
    Center for Biological Diversity v. Ilano, 
    928 F.3d 774
    , 779 (9th Cir. 2019), we
    hold that the USFS’s determination that the Crystal Clear Restoration (CCR)
    Project did not require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was arbitrary and
    capricious and so reverse. We do not reach the NFMA claims.
    The USFS’s decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious
    under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A), for two
    independent reasons.
    1. The effects of the Project are highly controversial and uncertain, thus
    mandating the creation of an EIS. See 
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.27
    (b)(4) & (5) (listing
    relevant factors for whether an EIS is required, including if the project’s effects are
    “highly controversial” and “highly uncertain”). The stated primary purpose of the
    CCR Project is to reduce the risk of wildfires and promote safe fire-suppression
    activities, but Appellants identify scientific evidence showing that variable density
    thinning will not achieve this purpose. Considering both context and intensity, as
    required by 
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.27
    , this evidence raises substantial questions about
    2                                    19-35665
    the Project’s environmental impact, and an EIS is required. See, e.g., Blue
    Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 
    161 F.3d 1208
    , 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)
    (holding that an EIS is required when an environmental assessment raises
    “substantial questions” about whether an agency’s action will have a significant
    effect on the quality of the human environment); see also Native Ecosystems
    Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    428 F.3d 1233
    , 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2005).
    “A project is ‘highly controversial’ if there is a ‘substantial dispute [about]
    the size, nature, or effect of the major Federal action rather than the existence of
    opposition to a use.’” Native Ecosystems Council, 
    428 F.3d at 1240
     (alteration in
    original) (quoting Blackwood, 
    161 F.3d at 1212
    ). “A substantial dispute exists
    when evidence . . . casts serious doubt upon the reasonableness of an agency’s
    conclusions.” In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
    751 F.3d 1054
    , 1069
    (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 
    241 F.3d 722
    , 736 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Monsanto Co. v.
    Geertson Seed Farms, 
    561 U.S. 139
    , 157 (2010)). To demonstrate a substantial
    dispute, appellants must show that “evidence from numerous experts” undermines
    the agency’s conclusions. Blackwood, 
    161 F.3d at 1212
    . “[M]ere opposition alone
    is insufficient to support a finding of controversy.” WildEarth Guardians v.
    Provencio, 
    923 F.3d 655
    , 673 (9th Cir. 2019).
    The Environmental Assessment (EA) explained that the CCR Project will
    3                                    19-35665
    use “variable density thinning” to address wildfire concerns. “In variable density
    thinning, selected trees of all sizes . . . would be removed.” This process would
    assertedly make the treated areas “more resilient to perturbations such as . . . large-
    scale high-intensity fire occurrence because of the reductions in total stand
    density.” Variable density thinning will occur in the entire Project area.
    Substantial expert opinion presented by the Appellants during the
    administrative process disputes the USFS’s conclusion that thinning is helpful for
    fire suppression and safety. For example, Oregon Wild pointed out in its EA
    comments that “[f]uel treatments have a modest effect on fire behavior, and could
    even make fire worse instead of better.” It averred that removing mature trees is
    especially likely to have a net negative effect on fire suppression. Importantly, the
    organization pointed to expert studies and research reviews that support this
    assertion.
    Bark also raised this issue: “It is becoming more and more commonly
    accepted that reducing fuels does not consistently prevent large forest fires, and
    seldom significantly reduces the outcome of these large fires,” citing an article
    from Forest Ecology and Management. Bark also directed the USFS to a recent
    study published in The Open Forest Science Journal, which concluded that fuel
    treatments are unlikely to reduce fire severity and consequent impacts, because
    often the treated area is not affected by fire before the fuels return to normal levels.
    4                                     19-35665
    Bark further noted that, while “Bark discussed [during the scoping process] the
    studies that have found that fuel reduction may actually exacerbate fire severity in
    some cases as such projects leave behind combustible slash, open the forest canopy
    to create more ground-level biomass, and increase solar radiation which dries out
    the understory[,] [t]he EA did not discuss this information.”
    Oregon Wild also pointed out in its EA comments that fuel reduction does
    not necessarily suppress fire. Indeed, it asserted that “[s]ome fuel can actually help
    reduce fire, such as deciduous hardwoods that act as heat sinks (under some
    conditions), and dense canopy fuels that keep the forest cool and moist and help
    suppress the growth of surface and ladder fuels . . . .” Oregon Wild cited more than
    ten expert sources supporting this view. Importantly, even the Fuels Specialist
    Report produced by the USFS itself noted that “reducing canopy cover can also
    have the effect of increasing [a fire’s rate of spread] by allowing solar radiation to
    dry surface fuels, allowing finer fuels to grow on . . . the forest floor, and reducing
    the impact of sheltering from wind the canopy provides.”
    The effects analysis in the EA did not engage with the considerable contrary
    scientific and expert opinion; it instead drew general conclusions such as that
    “[t]here are no negative effects to fuels from the Proposed Action treatments.”
    Appellants thus have shown a substantial dispute about the effect of variable
    density thinning on fire suppression. Although it is not our role to assess the merits
    5                                     19-35665
    of whether variable density thinning is indeed effective in the project area to
    prevent fires, or to take sides in a battle of the experts, see Greenpeace Action v.
    Franklin, 
    14 F.3d 1324
    , 1333 (9th Cir. 1992), NEPA requires agencies to consider
    all important aspects of a problem. See WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. E.P.A., 
    759 F.3d 1064
    , 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2014). Throughout the USFS’s investigative process,
    Appellants pointed to numerous expert sources concluding that thinning activities
    do not improve fire outcomes. In its responses to these comments and in its finding
    of no significant impact, the USFS reiterated its conclusions about vegetation
    management but did not engage with the substantial body of research cited by
    Appellants. Failing to meaningfully consider contrary sources in the EA weighs
    against a finding that the agency met NEPA’s “hard look” requirement as to the
    decision not to prepare an EIS. Blackwood, 
    161 F.3d at 1213
    . This dispute is of
    substantial consequence because variable density thinning is planned in the entire
    Project area, and fire management is a crucial issue that has wide-ranging
    ecological impacts and affects human life. When one factor alone raises
    “substantial questions” about whether an agency action will have a significant
    environmental effect, an EIS is warranted. See Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army
    Corps of Eng’rs, 
    402 F.3d 846
    , 865 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We have held that one of [the
    NEPA intensity] factors may be sufficient to require preparation of an EIS in
    appropriate circumstances.”). Thus, the USFS’s decision not to prepare an EIS was
    6                                      19-35665
    arbitrary and capricious. See Blackwood, 
    161 F.3d at 1213
     (holding that conflicting
    evidence on the effects of ecological intervention in post-fire landscapes made a
    proposed project highly uncertain, thus requiring an EIS).
    2. The USFS also failed to identify and meaningfully analyze the cumulative
    impacts of the Project. “Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which
    results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present,
    and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency . . . undertakes
    such other actions.” 
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.7
    . “Cumulative impacts can result from
    individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of
    time.” 
    Id.
     “[I]n considering cumulative impact, an agency must provide ‘some
    quantified or detailed information; . . . [g]eneral statements about possible effects
    and some risk do not constitute a hard look absent a justification regarding why
    more definitive information could not be provided.’” Ocean Advocates, 
    402 F.3d at 868
     (alterations in original) (quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest
    Serv., 
    137 F.3d 1372
    , 1380 (9th Cir. 1998)). “This cumulative analysis ‘must be
    more than perfunctory; it must provide a useful analysis of the cumulative impacts
    of past, present, and future projects.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land
    Mgmt., 
    284 F.3d 1062
    , 1075 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We have held that cumulative impact analyses were insufficient when they
    “discusse[d] only the direct effects of the project at issue on [a small area]” and
    7                                    19-35665
    merely “contemplated” other projects but had “no quantified assessment” of their
    combined impacts. Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
    387 F.3d 989
    , 994 (9th Cir. 2004).
    The EA ostensibly analyzed the cumulative effects of the CCR Project, and
    included a table of other projects that were “considered in the cumulative effects
    analyses.” The cumulative impact analysis is insufficient because there is no
    meaningful analysis of any of the identified projects. The table gave no
    information about any of the projects listed; it merely named them. The section of
    the EA actually analyzing the cumulative effects on vegetation resources did not
    refer to any of these other projects. Nor are there any specific factual findings that
    would allow for informed decision-making. The EA simply concluded that “there
    are no direct or indirect effects that would cumulate from other projects due to the
    minimal amount of connectivity with past treatments” and that the Project “would
    have a beneficial effect on the stands by moving them toward a more resilient
    condition that would allow fire to play a vital role in maintaining stand health,
    composition and structure.” These are the kind of conclusory statements, based on
    “vague and uncertain analysis,” that are insufficient to satisfy NEPA’s
    requirements. Ocean Advocates, 
    402 F.3d at 869
    .
    The EA also mentioned the possibility of cumulative effects in sections on
    other specific sub-topics such as fuels management, transportation resources, and
    8                                    19-35665
    soil productivity. These sections similarly relied on conclusory assertions that the
    Project has “no cumulative effects.” When the EA did acknowledge the possibility
    of the Project’s impact, such as in the section that analyzed the Project’s effects on
    spotted owls, it noted only that “[t]imber harvest on federal, tribal, and private
    land, and utility corridor operations have reduced the amount of suitable habitat . . .
    on the landscape and could continue to do so in the future,” without attempting to
    quantify the cumulative loss or naming other projects. Yet there were other
    relevant timber projects to discuss. Appellants pointed out at least three other
    recent or future timber projects in their comments responding to the EA, but the
    relevant section of the document limited its analysis to only the Project area and a
    1.2-mile buffer surrounding it. Such a small buffer zone fails to distinguish the
    EA’s cumulative impact analysis from an analysis of the direct effects of the
    Project. See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 
    387 F.3d. at 997
     (assessing
    cumulative effects at the critical habitat unit scale). The USFS’s failure to engage
    with the other projects identified by Appellants leaves open the possibility that
    several small forest management actions will together result in a loss of suitable
    owl habitat. Preventing or adequately mitigating this potential loss is the
    fundamental purpose of NEPA’s requirement that agencies analyze cumulative
    9                                    19-35665
    impacts, and we have no basis in the record to assess whether the USFS has taken
    the necessary steps to consider this possibility.
    Overall, there is nothing in the EA that could constitute “quantified or
    detailed information” about the cumulative effects of the Project. Ocean
    Advocates, 
    402 F.3d at 868
     (internal quotation marks omitted). The USFS’s
    analysis creates substantial questions about whether the action will have a
    cumulatively significant environmental impact. Therefore, this factor also requires
    the USFS to conduct an EIS. See 
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.27
    (b)(7).
    3. Because an EIS is required, and because the findings in the EIS could
    prompt the USFS to change the scope of the Project or the methods it plans to use,
    we do not reach the Appellants’ other claims. We reverse the district court’s
    judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the USFS
    for the preparation of an EIS.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    10                                     19-35665
    FILED
    Bark v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 19-35665
    APR 3 2020
    GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring:                                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I concur in full in the judgment and in all but section 2 of the majority’s
    disposition. The project’s proposed methodology of variable density thinning is
    both highly controversial and highly uncertain, so an environmental impact
    statement is required. I would not reach whether the Environmental Assessment’s
    discussion of cumulative impacts also was arbitrary and capricious.