Florence Monroe v. Andrew Saul ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    APR 6 2020
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FLORENCE M. MONROE,                              No.     18-35385
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01225-RJB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 2, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    Florence M. Monroe appeals the district court’s order affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    “We review the district court’s decision sustaining the [Administrative Law
    Judge’s (“ALJ”)] denial of social security benefits de novo and can reverse only if
    the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial
    evidence in the record.” Attmore v. Colvin, 
    827 F.3d 872
    , 875 (9th Cir. 2016).
    Additionally, we “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of a harmless
    error.” Buck v. Berryhill, 
    869 F.3d 1040
    , 1048 (9th Cir. 2017).
    1.    Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence.
    First, the ALJ properly rejected portions of Dr. Platter’s opinion, a non-
    examining physician, by referencing “specific evidence in the medical record.”
    Sousa v. Callahan, 
    143 F.3d 1240
    , 1244 (9th Cir. 1998). The ALJ noted
    inconsistencies with Monroe’s minimal physical examination findings that
    undermined Dr. Platter’s opined limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3)–(4),
    416.927(c)(3)–(4). The ALJ also specifically found that Dr. Platter’s opined
    limitations were inconsistent with Monroe’s level of activity. See Rollins v.
    Massanari, 
    261 F.3d 853
    , 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (discounting a treating physician’s
    2
    opinion, in part, because it was “inconsistent with the [claimant’s] level of
    activity”).1
    Second, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the opinions of the treating
    physicians (Dr. Shaw and Dr. Sharf) that Monroe is limited to sedentary work. The
    opinions of Dr. Shaw and Dr. Sharf are contradicted by the opinions of Drs.
    Kumar, Millett, and Coker. In rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions, the ALJ
    “set[] out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical
    evidence, stat[ed] [her] interpretation thereof, and ma[de] findings.” See
    Magallanes v. Bowen, 
    881 F.2d 747
    , 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cotton v.
    Bowen, 
    799 F.2d 1403
    , 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). The ALJ also found that the doctors’
    opinions were inconsistent with Monroe’s minimal physical examination findings
    discussed by the ALJ earlier in her decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4),
    416.927(c)(4). Therefore, even assuming (as Monroe argues) an error in
    discounting the treating physicians’ opinions because they were inconsistent with
    “the lack of observations of the claimant presenting in any distress at medical
    1
    Even assuming the ALJ erred rejecting Dr. Platter’s opined limitations
    based on Monroe’s “lack of treatment or complaints related to her left upper
    extremity,” this error would be “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
    determination,” because the ALJ offered these other specific and legitimate reasons
    for rejecting Dr. Platter’s opined limitations that are supported by substantial
    evidence. See Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
    Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    533 F.3d 1155
    , 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)).
    3
    appointments,” that error would be harmless, because it would be “inconsequential
    to the ultimate nondisability determination.” See 
    Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115
    .
    2.    The ALJ’s step-four finding is supported by substantial evidence and is free
    of legal error. Monroe concedes in her opening brief that her argument that the
    ALJ erred in her step-four determination “hinges on” the success of her previous
    arguments. Thus, because the ALJ did not harmfully err in her analysis of the
    medical evidence, Monroe’s argument fails.
    AFFIRMED.
    4