Unoch v. Rady Children's Hospital -Sd , 611 F. App'x 906 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                MAY 19 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED NURSES OF CHILDREN’S                      No. 13-56032
    HOSPITAL,
    D.C. No. 3:12-cv-02552-BEN-
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             BLM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    RADY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL -SAN
    DIEGO,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 8, 2015**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PREGERSON, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    United Nurses of Children’s Hospital, a union representing employees at
    Rady Children’s Hospital San Diego (“RCHSD”), appeals the district court’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    dismissal of its motion to confirm an arbitration award in its favor and vacatur of
    the remedy awarded. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “While we
    review de novo the decision to vacate or confirm an arbitration award, review of
    the award itself is ‘both limited and highly deferential’ and an arbitration award
    may be vacated only if it is ‘completely irrational’ or ‘constitutes manifest
    disregard of the law.’” PowerAgent, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 
    358 F.3d 1187
    ,
    1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Coutee v. Barington Capital Grp., 
    336 F.3d 1128
    ,
    1132-33 (9th Cir. 2003)). If the “arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying
    the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,” then the arbitrator’s
    award must be upheld. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Util. Workers Union of Am., 
    265 F.3d 787
    , 792 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
    Am., 
    531 U.S. 57
    , 62 (2000)). With these principles in mind, we reverse.
    1. RCHSD argues that the parties did not agree to submit the question of
    remedy to the arbitrator. Even assuming that this is true, the arbitrator reasonably
    interpreted the agreed-upon issue as impliedly encompassing the question of
    remedy. Section 607 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) grants the
    arbitrator the authority “to interpret, apply or determine . . . the agreed upon
    issue(s) submitted to him/her.” According the “arbitrator’s interpretation of the
    scope of the issue submitted to him . . . the same deference accorded his
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    interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement,” Pack Concrete, Inc. v.
    Cunningham, 
    866 F.2d 283
    , 285 (9th Cir. 1989), we conclude that the arbitrator
    reasonably interpreted the submitted issue to encompass the question of what
    remedy would be imposed if he found that the termination was without just cause.
    See Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 
    442 F.3d 727
    , 733 (9th Cir. 2006)
    (“The scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction extends to issues not only explicitly
    raised by the parties, but all issues implicit within the submission agreement.”).
    2. Section 607 grants the arbitrator the authority “to interpret, apply or
    determine compliance with the express language of” the CBA and “to interpret,
    apply or determine . . . the agreed upon issue(s) submitted to him/her.” RCHSD
    interprets the word “and” as limiting the arbitrator’s authority to only issues that
    both concern the express language of the CBA and that the parties have agreed to
    submit to the arbitrator. However, the CBA may reasonably be interpreted to
    provide two distinct grants of authority, namely, to determine compliance with the
    CBA and, independently, to determine the agreed-upon issues submitted to him.
    Imposing a remedy for wrongful discharge fits neatly within the arbitrator’s first
    grant of authority to “interpret, apply or determine compliance” with the CBA
    because the CBA prohibits RCHSD from discharging covered employees without
    just cause and generally confers on the arbitrator authority to impose “make
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    whole” remedies. Therefore, even if we assume that the parties did not impliedly
    submit the question of remedy to the arbitrator, the arbitrator could still impose a
    remedy under § 607 of the CBA.
    REVERSED.
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