Russell Rosco v. Experian Information Solutions ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 10 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RUSSELL D. ROSCO; BONNIE R.                     No.    19-35175
    ROSCO,
    D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00325-RMP
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    EXPERIAN INFORMATION
    SOLUTIONS, INC.; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 7, 2020**
    Before:      TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    Russell D. Rosco and Bonnie R. Rosco appeal pro se from the district
    court’s summary judgment in their action alleging violations of the Fair Credit
    Reporting Act (“FCRA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    review de novo. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 
    871 F.3d 751
    ,
    759 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
    Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) on the claims pertaining to
    plaintiff Russell D. Rosco’s accounts with First Bank Mortgage because plaintiffs
    failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Experian did not
    follow reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of reporting. See Guimond v.
    Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 
    45 F.3d 1329
    , 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (even if a report
    contained inaccurate information, a credit reporting agency will not be liable under
    the FCRA “if it establishes that an inaccurate report was generated despite the
    agency’s following reasonable procedures”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing the settlement
    agreement between plaintiffs and Trans Union, LLC, because the district court’s
    finding that plaintiffs agreed to the terms of the settlement agreement is not clearly
    erroneous. See Doi v. Halekulai Corp., 
    276 F.3d 1131
    , 1136-40 (9th Cir. 2002)
    (setting forth standard of review and concluding that the district court did not abuse
    its discretion by enforcing settlement agreement where parties agreed to the
    material terms); Ahern v. Central Pac. Freight Lines, 
    846 F.2d 47
    , 48 (9th Cir.
    1988) (district court’s finding that a party consented to and intended to be bound
    by a settlement agreement must be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous); Veith v.
    2                                    19-35175
    Xterra Wetsuits, LLC, 
    183 P.3d 334
    , 337 (Wash. 2008) (setting forth expressions
    constituting acceptance of an offer); Morris v. Maks, 
    850 P.2d 1357
    , 1359 (Wash.
    1993) (setting forth elements to determine whether informal writings establish a
    contract).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
    v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    19-35175