Saul Amaya-Mejia v. William Barr ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAUL AMAYA-MEJIA, AKA Saul Nos. 17-71489
Antonio Amaya, 19-70877
Petitioner,
Agency No. A044-612-046
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 4, 2020**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Saul Amaya-Mejia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen
(petition No. 17-71489) and the BIA’s order denying his motion to reconsider and
terminate proceedings (petition No. 19-70877). We have jurisdiction under 8
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of motions to reopen
or to reconsider. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We
deny the petitions for review.
As to petition No. 17-71489, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
Amaya-Mejia’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than 11
months after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and
where Amaya-Mejia did not establish changed country conditions in El Salvador to
qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010)
(evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v.
Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material
evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had
changed).
In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Amaya-Mejia’s
motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel where Amaya-Mejia
failed to show he had been prejudiced by the performance of former counsel. See
Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793-94 (prejudice results when “the performance of
counsel was so inadequate that it may have affected the outcome of the
proceedings” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as unsupported by the record Amaya-Mejia’s contentions that the
2 19-70877
BIA applied incorrect legal standards and ignored evidence.
As to petition No. 19-70877, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
Amaya-Meija’s motion to reconsider and terminate proceedings. See Karingithi v.
Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 2019) (notice to appear need not
include time and date of hearing to vest jurisdiction in the immigration court).
Thus, the government’s motion for summary disposition (Docket Entry No.
31) is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review are so
insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693
F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating standard).
Amaya-Mejia’s opposed motion to hold these petitions for review in
abeyance (Docket Entry No. 29) is denied.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 19-70877