Rony Gomez-Fuentes v. Loretta E. Lynch , 668 F. App'x 215 ( 2016 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         AUG 5 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RONY ARMANDO GOMEZ-FUENTES,                        No.      14-73475
    AKA Fredy Rodas-Dominguez
    Agency No. A206-408-440
    Petitioner,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted July 26, 2016**
    Before:        SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Rony Armando Gomez-Fuentes, native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions
    for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
    appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order of removal and denying his
    motion to remand. Our jurisdiction is governed by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We review
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    de novo claims of due process violations, Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 
    603 F.3d 1104
    ,
    1109 (9th Cir. 2010), and we review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion
    to remand, Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 
    538 F.3d 1057
    , 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). We
    deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
    We reject Gomez-Fuentes’ contentions that the IJ violated his due process
    rights by failing to advise him of various forms of relief. See Lata v. INS, 
    204 F.3d 1241
    , 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim);
    Valencia v. Mukasey, 
    548 F.3d 1261
    , 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2008) (there is no
    requirement that an alien be advised of the availability of relief where there is no
    apparent eligibility for it).
    The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gomez-Fuentes’ motion for
    a remand because he did not establish prima facie eligibility for the relief he
    sought. See Romero-Ruiz, 
    538 F.3d at 1062
     (“The BIA abuses its discretion if its
    decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”) (internal quotation and citation
    omitted).
    Finally, Gomez-Fuentes’ challenge to the agency’s bond determination is
    not properly before us, see Leonardo v. Crawford, 
    646 F.3d 1157
    , 1160 (9th Cir.
    2011) (setting forth procedure for challenging bond determinations), and we lack
    2                                      14-73475
    jurisdiction to consider Gomez-Fuentes’ right-to-counsel contention because he
    failed to raise it to the BIA, see Barron v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 674
    , 678 (9th Cir.
    2004) (petitioner must exhaust issues or claims in administrative proceedings
    below).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
    3                                    14-73475