Basilea Mena v. Robert Massie ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 26 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BASILEA MENA,                                   No.    19-15214
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00368-DCB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ROBERT MASSIE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted January 22, 2020
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,**
    District Judge.
    Defendant-Appellant police officer Massie (Massie) appeals from the district
    court’s denial of summary judgment (and motion for reconsideration) on Plaintiff-
    Appellee Mena’s (Mena) claim of excessive force. This court has jurisdiction to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
    the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
    hear interlocutory appeals from summary judgment denying qualified immunity.
    Plumhoff v. Rickard, 
    572 U.S. 765
    , 771-72 (2014). We review the denial of
    summary judgment de novo. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 
    728 F.3d 1086
    , 1090
    (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
    1.     Evaluating the force used by Massie under the standards articulated in
    Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 394–98 (1989), and Miller v. Clark County, 
    340 F.3d 959
    , 964 (9th Cir. 2003), we conclude that, viewing evidence in the light most
    favorable to Mena, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Massie’s use of
    force was objectively unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible.
    2.     Massie argued that qualified immunity protects him for his actions
    here. Qualified immunity does not apply where clearly established rights are
    violated. Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 202 (2001). Determining whether the
    right was clearly established at the time of the violation “must be undertaken in
    light of the specific context of the case[.]” Id. at 201. “A constitutional right is
    clearly established if every reasonable official would have understood that what he
    is doing violates that right.” Rodriguez v. Swartz, 
    899 F.3d 719
    , 728 (9th Cir.
    2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The clearly defined right
    should not be defined “at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 742 (2011). “The right must be settled law, meaning that it must be clearly
    established by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive
    2
    authority.” Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 
    946 F.3d 471
    , 477 (9th Cir. 2019) (per
    curiam).
    On June 22, 2016, there was a body of clearly established law that put
    Massie on notice that it would be excessive force to use violence that is
    foreseeably likely to cause more than de minimis amounts of pain and injury
    against an arrestee where the crime is a non-violent misdemeanor and the arrestee
    (1) was not a threat to the officers or anyone else, (2) was not a flight risk, (3) did
    not resist (or at most passively resisted) being handcuffed, and (4) was not warned
    that the officer was going to use violent force before it was applied. Gravelet-
    Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1089–93; Barnard v. Theobold, 
    721 F.3d 1069
    , 1073 (9th Cir.
    2013); Young v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 
    655 F.3d 1156
    , 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2011);
    Meredith v. Erath, 
    342 F.3d 1057
    , 1061 (9th Cir. 2003).
    AFFIRMED.
    3