Joshua Gonzales v. Connie Gipson , 659 F. App'x 400 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    AUG 11 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOSHUA JOEL ZAMORA GONZALES,                     No. 13-56498
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:12-cv-00862-BRO-
    PLA
    v.
    CONNIE GIPSON, Warden,                           MEMORANDUM*
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 7, 2015
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PREGERSON, D.W. NELSON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Joshua Joel Zamora Gonzales appeals the denial of his federal habeas
    petition, challenging his conviction for three counts of attempted murder and one
    count of shooting from a motor vehicle. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    The district court did not err in denying Gonzales’s petition. Viewed in a
    light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at trial allowed the
    jury to infer that Gonzales was not only present, but that he was the shooter. See
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979).
    The evidence presented at trial reflected that: (1) Gonzales and two other
    individuals were in a car in the area at the time of the shooting; (2) Gonzales was
    seated in the backseat of the car he was in; (3) one person shot from the back seat
    of the car in question and a second person shot from over the hood; (4) two
    different caliber shell casings were found at the scene; (5) Gonzales had been
    wearing a baseball cap featuring the Pirates “P” logo in support of the Playboyz
    gang that evening; (6) a person in the backseat of the car in question was wearing a
    baseball cap; (7) there was a dispute at the party that may have been gang-related,
    and Gonzales was “mingled” in with its participants; (8) Gonzales exchanged
    words with men on the street before the shooting occurred; (9) someone asked one
    of the victims for his gang affiliation; and (10) Gonzales tested positive for gunshot
    residue during his interview with police the next day.
    Though the evidence amassed to convict Gonzales was largely
    circumstantial, such evidence “can be used to prove any fact, including facts from
    which another fact is to be inferred, and is not to be distinguished from testimonial
    2
    evidence insofar as the jury’s fact-finding function is concerned.” Payne v. Borg,
    
    982 F.2d 335
    , 339 (9th Cir. 1993). While we agree with the magistrate judge that
    the evidence in this case is “far from overwhelming,” “[a] state court’s
    determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as
    ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of that decision.”
    Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado,
    
    541 U.S. 652
    , 664 (2004)). The district court did not err in denying the petition.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    Gonzales v. Gipson, No. 13-56498                                          FILED
    Pregerson, J., dissenting:
    AUG 11 2016
    I dissent. Joshua was convicted for a crime that occurred whenMOLLY
    he was   17 CLERK
    C. DWYER,
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    years old. He was investigated by a detective who, during preliminary proceedings,
    twice put incriminating words into Joshua’s mouth, words he never spoke. Joshua
    was convicted based on evidence that, as the magistrate judge noted, was “far from
    overwhelming.” In fact, two witnesses explicitly stated, one with complete
    certainty, that Joshua was not the shooter.
    Joshua was sentenced to a staggering term of 86 years and 8 months to life,
    including three 25-year mandatory gang enhancements. Because Joshua was just
    17 when the crime was committed, California law now entitles him to a youth
    offender parole hearing no later than his twenty-fifth year of incarceration. See Cal.
    Penal Code § 3051(b)(3); People v. Franklin, 
    63 Cal. 4th 261
    , 268 (2016). This
    provides little solace for a young man facing, what very well could be, a life
    behind bars for a crime in which no one was killed.
    For these reasons, I dissent.
    1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-56498

Citation Numbers: 659 F. App'x 400

Filed Date: 8/11/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023