Joyce Williams v. Andrew Saul ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JUN 4 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOYCE E. WILLIAMS,                              No.    17-16129
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02629-GMS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 2, 2020**
    Before:      LEAVY, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
    Joyce Williams appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
    insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). We review de novo,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Attmore v. Colvin, 
    827 F.3d 872
    , 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
    Contrary to Williams’s arguments, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did
    not err in finding that the opinions of two non-examining medical advisors were
    not consistent with the opinions of Williams’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Michael
    Fermo. See Buck v. Berryhill, 
    869 F.3d 1040
    , 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2017). The ALJ
    provided specific and legitimate reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Fermo’s
    opinions as both lacking support in the medical record and inconsistent with
    Williams’s reported activities. See Trevizo, 
    871 F.3d 664
    , 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (ALJ
    must assess the supportability of a medical opinion and its consistency with the
    record); Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    169 F.3d 595
    , 603 (9th Cir. 1999)
    (ALJ may discount a medical opinion based in part on the claimant’s inconsistent
    activities).
    The ALJ did not err in considering the discrepancies between Dr. Fermo’s
    medical opinion that Williams’s concentration was “severely limited” and Dr.
    Fermo’s medical examinations, which noted memory or concentration deficits only
    sporadically throughout Williams’s extensive medical record. Although Dr. Fermo
    noted Williams’s mood fluctuations, Dr. Fermo’s medical examinations on the
    whole reflected Williams’s intact memory and judgment, normal orientation, and
    clinical stability. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 692-93
    (9th Cir. 2009).
    2                                     17-16129
    The ALJ proffered specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting
    Williams’s symptom testimony as inconsistent with the objective medical
    evidence, inconsistent with the ALJ’s observations, and inconsistent with
    Williams’s self-reported activities, including performing daily household and
    family chores, driving, taking classes, shopping, paying bills, handling personal
    bank accounts, and socializing with extended family. See Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
    We do not consider Williams’s contentions that the ALJ erred by denying
    her request to subpoena the medical advisors, and in evaluating the lay witness
    evidence because Williams did not raise these arguments before the district court.
    See Ghanim v. Colvin, 
    763 F.3d 1154
    , 1160 (9th Cir. 2014).
    We agree with the district judge that any error in the ALJ’s analysis is
    harmless in light of the totality of the evidence.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     17-16129