Ed Alonzo v. Akal Security, Inc. ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 5 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ED E. ALONZO,                                   No.    19-15633
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00836-JJT
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    AKAL SECURITY INCORPORATED,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 3, 2020**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GOULD, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    Ed Alonzo (“Alonzo”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Akal Security, Inc. (“Akal”) in his Fair Labor Standards Act
    (“FLSA”) action. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
    judgment. United States v. Alameda Gateway, Ltd., 
    213 F.3d 1161
    , 1164 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2000). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Alonzo, we must
    determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the
    district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Lopez v. Smith, 
    203 F.3d 1122
    , 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). We also review de novo the district
    court’s interpretation of the FLSA and its regulations, which are questions of law.
    See, e.g., Magana v. Northern Mariana Islands, 
    107 F.3d 1436
    , 1438 (9th Cir.
    1997) (“We review de novo district court decisions regarding exemptions to the
    [FLSA].”). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    Akal is a government contractor employed to repatriate individuals ordered
    removed from the United States. Alonzo is a former Aviation Security Officer
    (“ASO”) for Akal. As an ASO, Alonzo provided security and other services for
    flights originating in Mesa, Arizona going to and from Central American countries.
    Alonzo challenges Akal’s meal period policy of automatically deducting one hour
    from each shift if the shift’s last leg was a flight back to the United States that was
    longer than ninety minutes and the flight had no detainees on-board (“Empty
    Return Legs”). The policy was described in Alonzo’s offer letter, in Akal’s
    timekeeping policy, and in the collective bargaining agreement between Akal and
    Alonzo’s union. Alonzo executed the first two documents and was a party to the
    third as a union member.
    2
    FLSA regulations expressly authorize unpaid meal periods only if they are
    “bona fide.” 
    29 C.F.R. §§ 785.19
    , 785.41. We apply the “completely relieved
    from duty” test to determine whether a meal period is bona fide. See Busk v.
    Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 
    713 F.3d 525
    , 531–32 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying the
    “completely relieved from duty” test), rev’d on other grounds, 
    135 S. Ct. 513
    (2014). Under this test, an “employee must be completely relieved from duty for
    the purposes of eating regular meals.” 
    29 C.F.R. § 785.19
    (a). An “employee is not
    relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while
    eating.” 
    Id.
    Critically, the relevant regulations do not require an employer to permit an
    employee to leave the business’s premises during a meal period for the meal period
    to be considered bona fide. 
    Id.
     § 785.19(b) (“It is not necessary that an employee
    be permitted to leave the premises if he is otherwise freed from duties during the
    meal period.”). The regulations, in fact, explicitly authorize unpaid meal periods
    while an employee is required to ride “a truck, bus, automobile, boat or airplane.”
    Id. § 785.41. Accordingly, it is not legally significant that Alonzo’s unpaid meal
    periods took place while he was on-board an airplane.
    Because Alonzo acknowledges that he did not perform any work during an
    unpaid meal period during his time at Akal, and because he could not recall any
    Empty Return Leg flight during which he did not have at least one hour of free
    3
    time, the district court properly concluded that Alonzo failed to raise a triable issue
    as to whether Akal is liable for violating the FLSA. See Busk, 713 F.3d at 531–32.
    AFFIRMED.
    4