Aurang Khan v. Pg&e ( 2020 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 14 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    AURANG ZAIB KHAN; HALIMA                        No.    18-56498
    ZAHIB,
    D.C. No. 5:16-cv-01060-DMG-KK
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY,
    a California corporation; DOES, 1 through
    10, inclusive,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 8, 2020**
    Before:      TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Aurang Zaib Khan and Halima Zahib appeal pro se from the district court’s
    summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourteenth
    Amendment claims stemming from alleged exposure to elevated levels of arsenic
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    and uranium. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
    Stephens v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
    935 F.3d 852
    , 854 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs
    failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether elevated levels of
    arsenic or uranium had the capacity to cause their alleged injuries, and whether
    plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from their exposure to elevated levels of arsenic
    or uranium. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 
    533 F.3d 1010
    , 1026 (9th Cir.
    2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must [] demonstrate that the defendant’s
    conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”); In re Hanford Nuclear
    Rsrv. Litig., 
    292 F.3d 1124
    , 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (in a toxic tort case, plaintiff
    must demonstrate general causation, “whether the substance at issue had the
    capacity to cause the harm alleged,” and specific causation, “whether a particular
    individual suffers from a particular ailment as a result of exposure to a substance”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining defendant’s
    objections to certain evidence submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to summary
    judgment because such evidence constituted inadmissible lay opinion on matters
    requiring scientific, technical, and specialized knowledge and neither plaintiffs nor
    the other declarants were qualified as experts on such matters under Federal Rule
    of Evidence 702. See Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702; Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
    
    526 U.S. 137
    , 141 (1999) (trial court’s gatekeeping obligation applies to all types
    2                                    18-56498
    of expert testimony); Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 
    523 F.3d 1051
    , 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court’s decision on admissibility of lay opinion
    testimony “will be overturned only if it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion”
    (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that plaintiffs failed
    to submit expert testimony on causation because they failed to disclose any expert
    witnesses in their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) expert disclosures. See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2); King v. Atiyeh, 
    814 F.2d 565
    , 567 (9th Cir. 1987),
    overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 
    693 F.3d 896
    (9th Cir.
    2012) (en banc) (pro se litigants are held to same procedural rules as other
    litigants). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, plaintiffs did not request an
    extension of time for expert discovery and the district court did not exclude any of
    their proffered expert testimony on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    37(c).
    We reject as meritless and unsupported by the record plaintiffs’ contentions
    that the district court violated their due process rights, was biased, or failed to
    conduct a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s Report & Recommendation.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    3                                     18-56498
    All pending motions and requests are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
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