Robert Lumpkin v. Sigh ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 11 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT J. LUMPKIN, No. 19-35595
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01644-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SIGH, Deputy #6076; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MAIL ROOM CLERKS, Snohomish
County Jail; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2020**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Robert J. Lumpkin appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment after a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
bench trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force while he was
confined at Snohomish County jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review for clear error a district court’s findings of fact following a bench trial
and de novo its conclusions of law. Huhmann v. Fed. Express Corp., 874 F.3d
1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court did not err in concluding that Lumpkin failed to prove, by
a preponderance of evidence, that defendants violated his constitutional rights
when defendants transported him to a new cell. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135
S. Ct. 2466, 2473-74 (2015) (elements of an excessive force claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 788
(9th Cir. 2018) (elements of an excessive force claim under the Eighth
Amendment). Nor did the district court clearly err in its factual findings. See
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (“If the district
court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety,” its factual finding is not clearly erroneous.).
Contrary to Lumpkin’s contention, the district court’s denial of summary
judgment on the ground of qualified immunity did not preclude it from later
resolving the case in defendants’ favor after a bench trial.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
Nicholas because Lumpkin failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to whether
2 19-35595
Nicholas personally participated in the incident. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement).
We reject as unsupported by the record Lumpkin’s contention that the
district court considered impermissible character evidence.
Appellees’ motions to file a document under seal (Docket Entry No. 9) and
to transmit an exhibit (Docket Entry No. 10) are granted.
AFFIRMED.
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