Ricardo Bravo-Bravo v. William Barr ( 2020 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 12 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICARDO BRAVO-BRAVO, Nos. 17-70245
Petitioner,
Agency No. A075-265-535
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 10, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SCHROEDER and BUMATAY, Circuit
Judges.
Petitioner Ricardo Bravo-Bravo, a native of Mexico, petitions for review of
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) 2016 reinstatement of his 2003
removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Petitioner argues that the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
reinstatement was improper because he did not reenter the United States illegally,
and that his underlying removal order constitutes a gross miscarriage of justice and
is thus reviewable. Neither argument is persuasive. We deny the petition.
First, Petitioner illegally reentered the United States. Petitioner was
previously removed after being convicted of an aggravated felony. When he was
removed, Petitioner was told he was prohibited from reentering the United States at
any time without express consent from the Attorney General. Despite this
warning, Petitioner contends that he entered the United States by presenting
unexpired documentation that was inspected by a border control agent. Although
such entrance into the United States is “procedurally regular,” such conduct was
deceptive and thus renders Petitioner’s entry illegal. Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder,
725 F.3d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2013).
Second, Petitioner’s initial removal order does not constitute a gross
miscarriage of justice. Petitioner argues that his underlying conviction constitutes
a gross miscarriage of justice, because his state conviction serving as the basis of
his removal was expunged by the state court, and because this court subsequently
held that a conviction under Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401(a)(1) is not an
aggravated felony. See United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.
2017). Yet, even if the state court subsequently expunged Petitioner’s crime, that
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expungement does not speak to the fairness of his underlying removal proceeding.
See Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.
2008). And, because a conviction under Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401(a)(1) was
an aggravated felony at the time Petitioner was convicted, no miscarriage of justice
occurred. United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 2000),
overruled on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Figueroa-Ocampo,
494 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705
F.3d 1012, 1018, 1021 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining to consider post-removal
precedent in collateral challenge to removal order).
Petitioner’s motion to supplement the record, Dkt. 26, is DENIED.
PETITION DENIED.
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