Samuel Martinez v. Salvador Villalon ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 17 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAMUEL MARTINEZ, No. 17-56669
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
5:13-cv-01064-DMG-DFM
v.
SALVADOR VILLALON, M.D.; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 16, 2020**
Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Samuel Martinez, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s
summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim in Martinez’s action
brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that prison medical officers were
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. We review de novo. Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2016) (summary judgment); Doughtery v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897
(9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal for failure to state a claim). We affirm.
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Martinez’s claims
alleging that Castillo, Gepulle, Deveza, and Villalon denied him adequate medical
care because Martinez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether these defendants acted with deliberate indifference. See Edmo v. Corizon,
Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 766, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (requirements of an
Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, including deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need); Hamby, 821 F.3d at 1092 (“deliberate
indifference is a high legal standard”; “[a] showing of medical malpractice or
negligence is insufficient”).
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Martinez’s claim
alleging that Deveza tricked him into withdrawing a grievance because Martinez
failed to exhaust administrative remedies concerning this claim. See Williams v.
Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015) (prisoner must “exhaust ‘such
administrative remedies as are available’ prior to bringing an action in federal
court” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
3. The district court properly dismissed Martinez’s claims against Blair,
2
Martinez, and Ortiz because Martinez made no specific allegations against these
defendants in the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).
4. The district court properly dismissed Martinez’s claims alleging that Elevazo
and Gulani denied him adequate medical care because Martinez failed to allege
facts in the SAC showing that either defendant acted with deliberate indifference.
See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 766, 785-86.
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims in the
SAC without leave to amend because Martinez failed to cure the complaint’s
deficiencies despite the district court’s specific instructions about how to do so. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (standard of review;
leave to amend should be given unless the deficiencies in the complaint cannot be
cured by amendment); see also Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F.,
792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave
to amend is particularly broad where the court has already given the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint.”).
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s untimely
discovery requests. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th
Cir. 2003) (district court has broad discretion to permit or deny discovery, and a
3
ruling denying discovery will not be disturbed absent the clearest showing of
actual and substantial prejudice).
7. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s request
for appointment of counsel because Martinez failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard
of review; explaining the “exceptional circumstances” requirement).
AFFIRMED.
4