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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 15 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NANCY SUSSMAN; MICHAEL No. 19-56329 SUSSMAN, Estate thereof by and thru his special administer for the estate, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01063-DMS-JLB Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v. SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding Submitted September 8, 2020** Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Nancy Sussman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
42 U.S.C. § 1983action arising out of the arrest and criminal prosecution of her son, decedent Michael Sussman. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We review for an abuse of discretion a denial of a motion to amend a complaint. Crowley v. Bannister,
734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm. Sussman failed to include any argument in her opening brief regarding the district court’s dismissal of her claims, and thus has waived any challenge to that issue. See McKay v. Ingleson,
558 F.3d 888, 891 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009) (arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief are waived). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sussman leave to file her proposed third amended complaint because further amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile[.]”); see also Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L.A.,
759 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he district court's discretion in denying amendment is particularly broad when it has previously given leave to amend” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted[.])). Contrary to Sussman’s contentions, Sussman was required to seek leave of court to file a third amended complaint because she had already amended her complaint once as a matter of course. See Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,
316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (“After a party has amended a pleading once as a matter of course, it may only amend further after obtaining leave of the court, 2 19-56329 or by consent of the adverse party.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.15(a))). We reject as meritless Sussman’s contentions that the district judge committed judicial misconduct and erred by dismissing without oral argument, and that the motions to dismiss were moot upon her filing her proposed third amended complaint. All pending motions and requests are denied. AFFIRMED. 3 19-56329
Document Info
Docket Number: 19-56329
Filed Date: 9/15/2020
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 9/15/2020